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Adoption Contracts and the Adult
Adoptee's Right to Identity
Heidi A. Schneider*
I. Introduction
It is early January. The sun is rising over the Mississippi.
My car is headed south. My mind is in the future. Anxious, ex-
cited, my appointment with the social worker at the adoption
agency is at 9:00. Driving toward one of the greatest mysteries of
my life, into the darkness of the past, I glance over at the frozen
waters of the great river. The ice has begun to melt in the prema-
ture warmth of winter. I have chosen to look deeply into the void I
have ignored for so many years. I am an adult adoptee, and I am
about to relive the earliest chapter in my life story.
Many adults who were adopted as children have made this so-
journ. Nearly one-third of all adopted persons search for vital in-
formation from their birth records, in total, approximately
1,650,000 searching adults.' This paper focuses on the difficulties
encountered by adults who wish to know about their personal his-
tory but are barred from such self-discovery by hostile adoption
laws. It also examines the issue of whether adoption contracts,
which legalize the veil of secrecy, are binding with respect to
adopted adults. In particular, legal skepticism about surrogacy
contracts, first cousins to adoption contracts, encourages us to look
* B.A., Carleton College (1979); M.A., Columbia University Teachers College
(1983); J.D., University of Minnesota Law School (1989). I dedicate this article to
all my parents: Carl and Dori, M. and B., Kathy and Oskar, Betty and Will, David
and Kay, and Bruce; and to my favorite adoptees: Barb, Leah, and Darragh.
1. As of 1981 there were approximately five million adoptees in the United
States. About 25 million people have been involved in adoptions directly as parents
or children. Statement submitted by Jean Paton, Director of Orphan Voyage, to
the Members of the U.S. Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources (July 31,
1988) (on file with Law & Inequality). The actual number of persons who search
for birthparents is difficult to ascertain since there is no national network to assist
and track adoptees. The statistic about the number of searching adult adoptees is a
rough figure that varies from one organization to another. The National Commit-
tee for Adoption claims a smaller figure of one percent of the adoptive population
who actually search. They derive this statistic from records in Great Britain since
the opening of birth records became mandatory. National Comm. for Adoption,
Adoption Factbook: United States Data, Issues, Regulations, and Resources 66
(1985).
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again at the validity of the adoption contract. Traditionally, the
basic rights of individual adoptees are compromised to protect the
state's interest in guaranteeing the privacy of parties to adoptions,
an interest founded on some essential misconceptions about
adoptees, adoptive parents, and birth parents. The article suggests
proposals for freeing the channels of information in a way that
benefits all parties to the adoption contract.
II. Evolution of Adoption Law
The social worker gazed benevolently upon my confusion.
She had witnessed it all before: the anger, the sadness, the resigna-
tion. "You see, the law in Minnesota protects everyone. You have
access to non-identifying information within our files. And your
birth mother is assured of her privacy until she wants to reveal
herself." She added proudly, "I helped draft this legislation." My
eyes were on my checkbook. I wrote out the check to the agency.
Two hundred twenty-five dollars in fees for searching. I left the
office and went back to sit. Alone. Looking at the river. I had
driven all this way to find out what? Thirty years ago, I had four
siblings on my mother's side, four siblings on my father's side, and
there was no record of any hereditary diseases. Thirty years ago.
Now the long wait began as the social worker tried to contact my
birth mother to find out if she would be willing to hear from me,
to fill in the blank of thirty years. Was she still alive? Would she
reject my inquiry? The key to my past was in her hands. Every-
thing was riding upon the consent of a stranger.
Although the rules maintaining the secrecy of adoption are
followed in the majority of states, statutes upholding confidential-
ity are not the only model for adoption proceedings.2 Several
countries have open adoption records with no known deleterious
effects on the numbers of children who are placed for adoption.3
2. Alabama and Kansas have open birth record laws that allow adoptees to ob-
tain their original birth certificates which contain their birthparents' names. Six-
teen states have a registry system which allows birthmothers and adoptees to send
their names and addresses to a central location to be released if the other person
begins a search. Registry states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, and Texas. Seven states have a search and consent procedure
which provides that no confidential information is released until birthparents and
adoptees consent: Connecticut, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The remaining twenty-six states retain confidential
birth records. National Committee for Adoption, supra note 1, at 65-66, 100.
3. Israel, Great Britain, and Finland all have open birth records for adopted
adults and have not experienced the negative effects envisioned by U.S. legislators
and judges. The U.S. adoption laws are the most highly structured and secretive in
[VCol. 6:185
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In some cultures, such as ancient Rome, adoption was used to ex-
tend the family line and to amass wealth.4 In such a society, adop-
tion was an accepted practice for building stronger stock in the
family. In contrast, adoption was not formally recognized in Eng-
land until passage of an adoption act in 1926. This was largely due
to the cultural emphasis upon establishing strong blood lines.5
Just as there is no common law with respect to adoption in
England, adoption in the United States is governed solely by state
statutes.6 Adoption information was not always restricted in the
United States. In fact, adoption records remained available to all
parties involved until well into the twentieth century.7 From 1920
to 1950, in both England and the United States, adoption increas-
ingly became part of the auspices of private adoption agencies and
social workers. Adoption was depersonalized and became a service
provided by "professionals,"8 instead of a transaction between peo-
ple who knew one another as friends, kin, or members of the same
community.9 In an era in which illegitimacy and out-of-wedlock
pregnancy stigmatized children and mothers, legislatures acted to
stop the selling of babies by baby brokers and decided that adop-
tion proceedings ought to be secret in order to protect both sets of
parents from harassment and blackmail.10 Many of these strict
adoption laws still apply today and act as an iron curtain for adult
the world. Arthur Sorosky, Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, The Adoption Tri-
angle 224 (1978).
4. Brenda Hoggett, Adoption Law: An Overview, in Adoption 131, 131-32
(Philip Bean ed. 1984).
5. Lita Schwartz, Adoption Custody and Family Therapy, 12 Am. J. Farn.
Therapy 51, 51 (1984).
6. In re Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d 581, 586, 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641 (Sur. Ct. 1978)
(because adoption is a creature of statute, not of the common law, statutes regard-
ing adoption must be strictly construed), qff'd, 72 A.D.2d 734, 442 N.Y.S.2d 963
(1979), qff'd sub. nom. Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 418
N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
7. Minnesota was the first state to seal adoption records in the 1920's, followed
by Iowa in 1932. Letter from Jean Paton to Heidi Schneider (Oct. 8, 1987) (on file
with Law & Inequality). Jean Paton is the founder of Orphan Voyage, one of the
original adoption search organizations, and a well-known activist for promoting the
rights of adult adoptees. See also Lamed v. Parker, 360 So. 2d 906, 907 (La. Ct. App.
1978)
8. Hoggett, supra note 4, at 134.
9. Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. Farn. L. 677, 689
(1981-1982). One quaint, if unusual, example is a 1643 case in which a man adopted
his friend: "I doe make and adopt my dearest beloved Friend Robert West to bee
my lawful adopted heire and Executor to possesse enjoye and inhirit all my whole
estate remayning within the Collony of Virginia . I..." d. (quoting County Court
Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia, 1640-1645, at 307 (S. Ames ed. 1968)).
10. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 52. Legislators might have feared that unscrupu-
lous people might blackmail a birthmother years later by threatening to disclose
the illegimate child to her present family, who know nothing of her "indiscretion."
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adoptees and birth parents who wish to discover answers to their
personal questions.
With this general history in mind, we turn to an examination
of the people who are affected by adoption laws: birthparents,
adoptive parents, and adoptees.
III. The Adoption Triangle: Introducing the Parties
It was the most difficult letter I had ever written. She was,
after all, a person utterly unknown to me. An empty slate, the op-
portunity of a lifetime, to tell my life story to someone who was
intimately concerned. She was the ultimate audience. Unlike a
pen pal with whom one can create a persona and sustain it for
years, I felt it was crucial to sketch flesh and blood on paper. I
wanted her to know me as I know myself without the filters of
family, friendship, career, or education. No autobiography could
be more terrifying or more exhilarating.
A. The Adoptive Parents
Parents adopt children for many reasons, but the two most
common reasons cited are infertility and strong religious, social, or
humanitarian beliefs.'" Fertile parents who adopt are more will-
ing to adopt hard-to-place children' 2 and often have biological chil-
dren as well.13 In one sense, their concerns differ somewhat from
parents who adopt because they are infertile. Infertile couples
often experience a sense of inadequacy or failure because they are
unable to produce children of their own.14 These feelings of inse-
curity are often manifested in the relationship with the adopted
child. For example, infertile parents are typically more possessive
of the child, allowing less independance as the child grows.'
5 It
follows that infertile couples are most threatened by opening adop-
tion records and most strongly discourage their child from search-
11. Jean Pierce, Misconceptions About Adoptive Families, 13 Early Child Dev.
& Care 365, 367 (1984). William Feigelman & Arnold Silverman, Chosen Children:
New Patterns in Adoptive Relationships 44, 60 (1983). Other reasons for adoption
may include wanting a child of a particular nationality, wanting to expand a family
without further pregnancy, and having the option of choosing the sex of the child.
12. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 42-43.
13. Id. at 62. Parents who adopt hard-to-place children express a desire to give
a disadvantaged child a loving home. Some describe a concern about their responsi-
bility as Americans to provide a family to a third-world child whose plight as an
orphan was the result of U.S. military intervention. Others want to enlarge their
families without increasing world population.
14. Sorosky, Baran & Parmor supra note 3, at 84.




Adoptive parents, both fertile and infertile, have a number of
characteristics in common.17 They suffer from a basic conflict
with respect to their adopted child, as if to say "I want you to
know about your heritage, but I want you to be mine."'18 To main-
tain the birthmother's confidentiality, information about the
child's background is closed to the adoptive parents, as well as to
the adopted child. The secrets surrounding the adoption may have
an impact on the way the child is brought up as the adoptive par-
ents struggle with their own doubts and fears about the child's
background.
Most of the difficulties of bringing up an adopted child have
to do with intimacy issues. Emotionally, insecurities about being
infertile trouble many adoptive parents. Adoptive parents have a
fundamental, mostly subconscious fear that they will lose their
adopted child.19 Obtaining the child is not in itself an easy process.
Adoptive parents are screened by social workers and evaluated on
their home life and parenting skills.20 The adoptive parents often
worry that if they are not perfect parents, the professionals will
come and remove the child as suddenly as she arrived.21 These
anxieties lurk beneath the surface and are reflected in over-protec-
tiveness, intense concern for the child's health, and excessive con-
cern about the child's academic and social success. 22 On the other
hand, adoptive parents may dissociate themselves from the behav-
ior problems of the adopted child and blame the difficulties on
"bad blood" or the suspicious parentage of the child.2
3
16. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 67-68.
17. The typical adoptive mother is white, between the ages of 30- and 44-years
old, and has some college education. She is unable to have children and has no
other children besides her adopted children. She works part-time or is out of the
labor force entirely. About two percent of the United States population adopts chil-
dren. National Committee for Adoption, supra note 1, at 54-56.
18. Rita Dukette, Value Issues in Present Day Adoption, 63 Child Welfare 233,
235 (1984).
19. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 84.
20. For a discussion of the factors social workers do and should examine when
researching potential adoptive parents, see Roberta Andrews, Adoption: Legal Reso-
lution or Legal Fraud?, Ann. Progress Child Psychiatry & Child Dev. 351, 354-56
(1979).
21. Because the majority of adoptees who search for birthparents are female, I
have used feminine pronouns throughout the article when referring to adoptees.
For the sake of contrast, male pronouns are used to describe biological children and
other people who are not adoptees.
22. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor , supra note 3, at 77.
23. Id. at 78. See also Jill Hodges, Two Crucial Questions: Adopted Children in
Psychoanalytic Treatment, 10 J. Child Psychiatry 47, 56 (1984) (adoptive parents
may see approved characteristics of their child as products of the adoptive environ-
ment and disliked characteristics as products of biological heredity). Parents may
1988]
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The irony of adoptive parents' fears about losing the child
emotionally or physically is that they are unfounded. The bonding
of a baby to its mother can take place for some time after birth,
and young children bond psychologically to the mother they know
best.2 4 Furthermore, after the child is formally adopted, the social
workers may not remove the child without bringing a lawsuit
against the parents under child protection statutes. Given child-
hood bonding patterns and legal protections, parents should not
fear losing an adopted child any more than they fear losing a bio-
logical child. Nonetheless, the insecurities remain and are exacer-
bated by the lack of knowledge that adoptive parents have about
their child's origins.
B. The Birthmother
There are many misconceptions about the typical
birthmother. The stereotype sketches her as very young, unmar-
ried, promiscuous, and emotionally unstable. Contrary to stereo-
type, studies of mothers who have placed their children for
adoption show that they are as varied as the general population.25
Birthmothers do however have some traits in common. The
primary conflict for a birthmother is "I want to keep you, but I
have to give you up to get on with my life."2 6 Perhaps unexpect-
edly, birthmothers frequently display emotional maturity; they
have less of a need to rely on a baby for love and security.
Birthmothers demonstrate their independence by placing the child
for adoption.27 A majority of birthmothers expressed a sense of
love or commitment to the birthfather but realized that circum-
stances did not allow for a child in the relationship.28 Many
birthmothers remain curious about the child they placed for adop-
tion throughout their lives.29 Most talk of the love they feel for
be troubled as the child reaches adolescence and begins to discover herself as a sex-
ual person. Since sexuality issues, such as out-of-wedlock pregnancy and infertility,
are also adoption issues, this period in the adopted child's life may be particularly
rocky for the adoptive parents. Stanley Schneider & Esti Rimmer, Adoptive Par-
ents' Hostility Toward Their Adopted Children, 6 Children & Youth Serv. Rev. 345,
350-51 (1984). These authors also posit that antagonism heightens between the
adopted adolescent and the opposite sex parent because of the weaker incest barri-
ers in adoptive families. Id. at 349-50.
24. For a discussion of the effects of maternal deprivation and infant develop-
ment, see Martin Herbert, Causes and Treatment of Behavior Problems in Adop-
tive Children, in adoption 83, 86 (Philip Bean ed. 1984).
25. See generally Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 47-72.
26. Dukette, supra note 18, at 235.
27. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 48-49.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 54.
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the child and express a strong desire to know of the child's well
being.30
According to one study, the vast majority of birthmothers
favor procedures that would help adoptees and birthparents reu-
nite.3 1 More than half of the birthmothers agreed that opening
birth records would be a positive step.32
What binds birthmothers together is the feeling of guilt or
failure for having had to give up a child for adoption.3 3 For many,
this guilt could be lessened by opening birth records to give
birthmothers access to information about the child. Most
birthmothers would probably discover that the child is healthy and
loved and that their difficult choice at such a crucial time was good
for the child.
C. The Adopted Child
Adopted persons go through life with a hole inside.3 4 It is
30. See id. at 55-72. Jean Paton stressed the impact of the secrecy on
birthmothers: "[When the birthmother anticipates reunion with her surrendered
child at some future date she has no way of knowing what special developments in
the character of that child ... will be there to greet her." Paton, supra note 7. One
mother petitioned a Rhode Island court to gain access to her daughter's adoption
records. She described her desire to meet her child in this way:
"[I want to] see what type of child she's turned out to be and what she
looks like and what her voice sounds like and what, you know, how
she acts and things like this and what type of a relationship she has in
the home. I'd like to see her relationship with the people, how she in-
teracts. I'd like her to know me as her mother; but, also, I'd like her
to realize that her adoptive mother is also her mother. She has two
mothers no matter how you look at it."
In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203, 205, 397 A.2d 511, 513 (1979).
31. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 54 (82% of birthmothers sur-
veyed). See also Leverett Millen & Samuel Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special
Case of Pathological Bereavement, 55 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 411, 413 (1985).
32. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 54 (53% of birthmothers sur-
veyed). Of course, there are birthmothers who have tried to sever any ties with the
past and have no wish to be reminded of the infant they once carried. These wo-
men, a small minority of all birthmothers, are alarmed at the possibility of opening
birth records to adopted children. See, e.g., Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3,
at 70-71.
33. "The commonly held assumption that the birth mother wants to completely
sever her ties with the child and begin life anew needs to be re-examined. In actu-
ality, the mother's greatest concern is usually that her child will never forgive her
for abandoning him/her." Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 49. A mother
forms an intimate relationship with a baby even before it is born. The bonding hap-
pens during the nine months of being pregnant, not during the first hours after
birth. That bonding continues during the birth process as a mother risks her health
and goes through taxing physical labor. Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M,
The Nation, May 23, 1987 at 682, 686. The grief process of giving up a child is much
like that of bereaving a death and may have lasting effects upon the birthmother.
Millen & Roll, supra note 31, at 418.
34. The adoptee, no matter how well adjusted, always suffers in the psychohis-
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most tangible when filling out a simple form at the doctor's office
and having to leave the section called "Family Medical History"
blank. From early childhood, an adoptee is forced to fill gaps for
herself and others. The adopted child learns a retort to the re-
mark: "That's funny, you don't look like your sisters/parents."
35
Being adopted is like living in a vacuum, creating oneself in one's
own image. But inside there is emptiness, and the emptiness feels
like abandonment.
During adolescence the hole begins to ache. Adolescence is
the time when young people set out to discover their identities.
This task is especially challenging for an adopted child.36 More-
over, an adopted child's questions about her origins may be seen as
a way to antagonize her parents. Other conflicts arise in dealing
with sexuality. The adopted child may be afraid of her own sexual
awakening, fearing she may repeat the "mistake" her birthmother
made. Some psychologists also theorize that the incest taboo is not
as strong in adoptive families and that fear of incest may cause am-
bivalent feelings about sex in adolescent adoptees.37 Typically, ad-
olescent adoptees deal with these conflicts by isolating themselves
or acting out their frustrations.38 Adopted children in general
seem to be prone to conduct problems related to stress.39
A common escape for the adopted child is to fantasize about
the birthmother. While a biological child may fantasize about evil
witches and fairy godmothers, eventually he learns to sort out his
angry feelings toward his parents and outgrows his belief in fairy
tales. The fairy tale never disappears for the adopted child.40 The
torical realm. The psychohistorical realm includes the part of a person's identity
that relates to his or her sense of genealogy, a feeling of connection to past and fu-
ture family members. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 14.
35. See Hodges, supra note 23, at 50-53 for a discussion of how the adopted child
tries to construct a physical representation of the biological parents.
36. See Sorosky, Baran &. Pannor, supra note 3, at 13-14. As adopted children
approach and go through adolescence, it is common for them to question their ori-
gins. The urge to know one's origins is a fundamental human desire. This desire is
related to the need to become whole through an understanding of where one comes
from and from whom physical traits and characteristics are inherited. Schwartz,
supra note 5, at 55. The body is a strong link to the birthparents. For this reason,
many adoptees are anxious about their bodies and feel that they were given up be-
cause something was physically wrong with them. Hodges, supra note 23, at 52.
37. See Schneider & Rimmer, supra note 23, at 349-50.
38. See id. at 350-51.
39. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 96. But see Herbert, supra note
24, at 84 (emotional and behavior problems are not necessarily more prevalent in
adopted children than in non-adopted children).
40. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 99. Not all fantasies about
birthparents are positive. For example, the birthmother may become the "bad"
parent in the adoptee's imagination. Stanley Kaye, Self-Image Formation in
Adopted Children, 13 J. Contemp. Psychotherapy 175, 179 (1982).
[Vol. 6:185
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kindly birthmother is always out there somewhere, and the child
dreams of being rescued. Because of the birthmother fantasy, it
may take longer for an adopted child to work through feelings of
anger and frustration at the adoptive parents. Some adopted chil-
dren may also have a deep fear that if they misbehave they will be
abandoned again.41
An inherent conflict for the adopted child is "I love you both,
but I have to find my birthparents."42 The child may be afraid to
ask questions about the past, especially if given the feeling that
such questions are not welcome.43 This only exacerbates the feel-
ing of a void in the child and may also lead to feelings of inade-
quacy or worthlessness. 44 Adopted children really want to feel
that the adoptive parents are the real parents, but the question of
origin creates a rub. The sense of low self-esteem found in so
many adopted children has to do with the question: "Why was I
given up by my first parents?"45 As children, adoptees may dis-
cover that discussing the adoption is painful for their adoptive par-
ents. Because fears of hurting the adoptive parents continue into
adulthood, many adopted adults will not begin the search until af-
ter their adoptive parents have died.46
IV. The Role of the State
Her first letter to me was retyped on the agency stationery.
41. See Kaye, supra note 40, at 177-78.
42. Dukette, supra note 18, at 235.
43. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 206-07. See also Hodges, supra
note 23, at 48-49.
44. While the adopted child deals with her own uncertainties about the past,
she also receives subtle messages from her adoptive and birth families that can lead
to feelings of worthlessness. "The tragedies, inabilities and failures of both the bio-
logical and adoptive parents are reflected in the adopted child and his psychological
development." Kaye, supra note 40, at 175-76. The sense of worthlessness may re-
flect the child's sense that she does not fit in. Among interracial adoptees, for ex-
ample, those from groups who are most readily assimilated are least likely to
search. Black adoptees search most frequently, followed by Caucasians, Koreans
and Columbians. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 222. See also Hodges,
supra note 23, at 55-56 (adopted child's sense of self as a precious and valued child
may be damaged).
45. Robin Henig, Chosen and Given, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1988, (Magazine), at
70, 70-71.
46. Michael Sobol & Jeanette Cardiff, A Sociopsychological Investigation of
Adult Adoptees' Search for Birth Parents, 32 Fam. Rel. 477, 481 (1983). An impor-
tant piece of the adoptee's identity is tied up with her adoptive family. For some
adoptees, the search to explore the rest of their identities may not be worth the
risk of destroying the ties to the family they know. See Andrews, supra note 20, at
357-58. "It should not be forgotten that many adopted children have made life
richer, more meaningful and more rewarding for their parents. This experience
can surround the adoption with a positive aura strong enough to bind parents and
child through identification and mutual need." Id. at 357.
Law and Inequality
The social worker enclosed a cover letter indicating that they had
made a few changes in order to delete identifying information.
"You may call me Marion," she had written. "What is your
name?" A surprising question, but of course she did not know my
name. I wondered about what she had called me in her mind all
these years. The Baby? The Little Girl? "Dear Marion," I wrote,
"My name is Heidi."
Each state retains a strong interest in the adoption process
from a public policy perspective. By passing statutes with respect
to adoption, the states are attempting to preserve normal family
relationships, protect their citizens' right to privacy, and, perhaps,
encourage adoption over abortion or single parenthood.
Courts, which are bound to interpret the state statutes, con-
tinue to hold that the secrecy which surrounds birth records is
maintained in order to protect the adoptee. "[It] is the very es-
sence of the State's interest in the adoptive process-to help the
adoptee grow to be a full and healthy member of society."47 At
least one court held that this infringement upon the adoptee's
right to know is justified by the state's police power, an extensive
"power [that] can be neither abdicated nor bargained away, and is
inalienable even by express grant. [A]ll contract and property
rights are held subject to its fair exercise."
48
Specifically, the states fear that more relaxed standards of ac-
cess to birth records would be a detriment to the adoption process.
Potential adoptive parents might be unwilling to adopt a child if
birthparents had access to the child's name and address, and adop-
tion agencies would have trouble placing the children in their
care.49 There is also a concern that a birthmother who has begun
a new life might have her future destroyed if the adopted child
reentered her life without her consent. A woman might select to
47. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 312, 372
A.2d 646, 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). See also Bradey v. Children's Bureau,
275 S.C. 622, 626, 774 S.E.2d 418, 421 (1981) (the confidentiality of the adoption pro-
cess serves the best interests of adoptees generally); Golan v. Louise Wise Serv., 69
N.Y.2d 343, 347, 507 N.E.2d 275, 278, 514 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 (1987) (even when all par-
ties have consented to the release of information, the court must protect the state's
interest in maintaining the secrecy of adoption proceedings).
48. In re Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d 581, 586, 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978)
(quoting Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914)), qff'd sub nom.
Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d
283, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
49. See In re Maxtone-Graham, 90 Misc. 2d 107, 109, 393 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (Sur.
Ct. 1975) (court concerned that disturbing confidential relationship between foster




abort the fetus rather than to face such a frightening scenario.50
The state's interest in adoption is essentially a concern for
the privacy of all parties involved in the adoption. The adoptive
parents want a peaceful, normal family life, free from the prying
eyes of birthparents or agents of the court.51 Adoptive parents also
deserve the devotion of their adopted child, particularly in later
life when they need special care.52 Birthparents have a need for
anonymity so that they can pursue their goals without fear of in-
terruption by strangers.53 Adopted persons deserve a fresh start,
without any danger of harassment by birthparents and free from
unpleasant background information. 54
These being the reasons given for regulating adoptions, it is
important to examine the process itself to see if it truly meets the
goals of privacy so important to the state. Then one must look at
the needs of the parties to determine if exercise of the police
power with respect to adoptions is actually required.
V. The Elements of the Adoption Contract
It came as such a shock. My birthfather refused to give his
consent to any contact with me. Everything had gone so smoothly.
The social worker was able to locate my birthmother in a week
My birthmother had agreed to correspond with me through the so-
cial worker. We had exchanged photos and letters. Suddenly the
first rejection. I was unprepared for the powerlessness.
There are four basic considerations in the adoption proce-
dure: the consent of the parties, due process and the right to be
heard, the adoption decree, and the sealing of the birth records.
Following is a discussion of the procedures used in adoption that
are designed to support the state's interest in protecting the pri-
vacy rights of the individuals involved.
50. National Committee for Adoption, supra note 1, at 65-66.
51. In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203, 205, 397 A.2d 511, 513-14 (1979). The court wor-
ried that even the appointment of a guardian to check on the well-being of the
child "casts a cloud of uncertainty upon the minds of all adoptive parents who now
realize that some day a court attache may be at their doorstep acting as a courier
for a parent whose right to visit with or talk to the adoptive couple's child was sup-
posedly terminated." Id. See also Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. 610, 616, 355 S.E.2d 819,
825 (1987) (adoption of baby abandoned by carnival workers was exposed in local
newspaper when birthmother returned seventeen years later to meet her daughter;
court held adoptive family had a cause of action for tortious invasion of privacy).
52. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
53. See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 68 Or. App. 573, 580, 684 P.2d 581,
588 (1984) aff'd in part & rev'd in part en banc, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985).
54. In re Estate of Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 354, 358, 476 N.E.2d 298, 302, 486 N.Y.S.2d
899, 903 (1985). See also Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 237,
418 N.E.2d 1302, 1303, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
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A. Consent to Adoption
The primary issue of consent has to do with the
birthrnother's decision to give up the child. There seems to be no
contention about the consent of the adoptive parents.5 5 Consent of
birthfathers to adoption is an emerging area of the law, and it may
be unnecessary to obtain the putative father's consent in order to
place the child.56 The child, of course, cannot legally give consent
to the adoption.57
In order to protect birthmothers from being coerced into giv-
ing up the child, state statutes allow the birthmother a certain pe-
riod of time during which she may withdraw her consent to the
adoption.58 Naturally, the possibility that the birthmother might
withdraw her consent to the adoption is one of the deepest fears of
adoptive parents. Withdrawal of consent places the adoptive par-
ents in a very difficult bind. They must choose between surren-
dering their child without protest5 9 and enduring a custody
55. The author's search for relevant case law revealed no cases in which con-
sent of the adoptive parents was at issue when the child had been adopted shortly
after birth. In an unusual case, an immigrant to the U.S. offered to adopt his niece
if she moved to this country and took care of him in his old age. She moved as
planned but was not adopted before the old man had remarried and died. The
question in the case was, though she was not formally adopted, was she still enti-
tled to a child's share in his estate. The court decided in her favor on a contract
issue. Pangarova v. Nichols, 419 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 1966). See also Roberts v. Sutton,
317 Mich. 458, 27 N.W.2d 54 (1947) (stepdaughter raised by deceased but not
adopted by him until she was 25 was sole heir under laws of intestacy).
56. In re Adoption of Jessica XX, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 420, 430 N.E.2d 896, 899, 446
N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (N.Y. 1981), off'd, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). For a dis-
cussion of the policy behind not requiring the putative father's consent, see In re
Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 572-73, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489-90, 370
N.Y.S.2d 511, 516-17 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976). Even if the pu-
tative father's consent is unnecessary, the putative father may have the right to
present evidence relevant to the child's best interests to the court during the adop-
tion proceeding. In re "Male F", 97 Misc. 2d 505, 509, 411 N.Y.S.2d 982, 986 (Sur. Ct.
1978).
57. See Unif. Adoption Act § 5, 9 U.L.A. 23-24 (1988) (consent of child required
only if child is above age 10).
58. The statutory waiting period to withdraw consent ranges from one to twelve
months. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 53. Even withdrawing her consent does not
guarantee that the birthmother will recover her infant. If the court decides that
the birthmother is not acting in the child's best interests, then the petition of the
adoptive parents can be granted without her consent. See In re McTaggart, 4 Oh.
App. 2d 359, 365, 212 N.E.2d 663, 670 (1965) (birthmother who withheld her consent
after giving up the child for adoption was estopped by the court). Contra In re
Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 290, 723 P.2d 829, 834 (1986) (natural parents' consent to
adoption final and irrevocable upon execution of consent and delivery of child to
adoptive parents).
59. Adoptive parents who give up the child without a fight are apt to experi-
ence intense grief, depression, and shame at not having contested the withdrawal of
consent. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 53-54. Not surprisingly, these emotions parallel
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battle.60 If the birthmother has not expressed her desire to keep
the child during the statutory period allowing withdrawal of con-
sent, her rights to the child are terminated unless she can later
prove that she acted under fraud, duress, or undue influence.61
B. The Adoption Hearing
An uncontested adoption proceeding is a simple affair. No
party is represented by legal counsel. The adoptive parents repre-
sent themselves.62 The child is not considered a necessary party to
the action and is never represented at the hearing unless the peti-
tion is contested. Apparently, the reasoning is that in an uncon-
tested proceeding the child's interests are identical to the adoptive
parents' interests. Therefore, the child, who is of course a minor,
is deemed adequately represented by the primary caretakers at the
adoption proceeding.6 3
When a petition is contested, the adoptive parents, the
birthmother, and in some jurisdictions, the birthfather, are given
the opportunity to be heard.64 The child may be represented by a
guardian ad litem.65 Some of the parties may choose not to be
present at the hearing in order to maintain personal anonymity.66
They are represented by counsel at the hearing. If the attorney
has represented both parties in the adoption process, however, the
shield of confidentiality may fail at the contested hearing. The at-
torney may be forced to disclose the names of both parties he
the birthmother's feelings after she gives up the child. Millen & Roll, supra note
31, at 413.
60. Adoptive parents who fight for custody "may suffer debilitating anxiety."
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 54. Additionally, a custody contest "that is prolonged
until the child has been with the [adoptive] parents for six months or more is likely
to have deletrious effects on the child." Id.
61. See In re Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 290, 723 P.2d 829, 834 (1986).
62. Telephone interview with Robert DeNardo, A.C.S.W., Supervisor of Child
Welfare, Catholic Charities of St. Paul (Oct. 26, 1988).
63. After the birthparents terminate their parental rights, the state, through
the Human Services Commission, has guardianship of the child. The state dele-
gates guardianship to a social services agency. In Minnesota, the child is placed
with the adoptive parents, but the parents must wait three months before they may
file a petition for adoption with the court. The court notifies the agency of the peti-
tion for adoption. At that time, the agency sends a consent form. The consent is a
statement by the social services agency supporting the adoption of the child by the
adoptive parents. With the agency's consent is documentation of the birthparents'
termination of parental rights. Id.
64. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
65. See In re Adoption of Female Infant, 237 A.2d 468, 469 (D.C. 1968).
66. The identity of the parties may be protected upon a motion from either
party and proper service upon the opposing counsel. In re Procedure for Protecting




C. The Adoption Decree
As a young teenager interested in astrology, I wanted to know
the time of my birth. When I asked my mother when I was born,
she pulled out my birth certificate. I had never seen it, but the cer-
tificate told me nothing I didn't already know. Mom suggested I
write to the adoption agency and ask them for the time of my
birth, but she added: "Better not tell them what you want it for.
I'm sure a Catholic agency would not be happy to hear that you are
serious about astrology."
The adoption decree is a formal document which proves that
the adoption is legally valid.68 It is issued at the conclusion of the
adoption hearing. The adopted child is given a new birth certifi-
cate which contains the date of birth, place of birth, and the adop-
tive parents names as parents. No other information is provided
on the new birth certificate.
After the decree has been issued, the adoptive parents be-
come the legal parents, and the birthparents forfeit any rights to
the child.69 If the adoption agency misrepresents the child's health
to the adoptive parents, they may have legal standing to bring suit
for wrongful adoption.70 Birthparents may not have an analagous
cause of action.
71
The adoption decree is the physical manifestation of the
adoption contract. Some may question its validity as a contract,
however, particularly because the consent of the birthmother is
67. Tierney v. Flower, 32 A.D.2d 392, 396, 302 N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (1969) (an attor-
ney who represented both the birthmother and the adoptive parents in the proceed-
ing was required to disclose the names and addresses of his clients when later the
birthmother sought to have the baby returned to her).
68. See Succession of Hilton, 175 So. 2d 366, 368 (1965) (if the original decree is
not in existence, extrinsic evidence may be used to prove an adoption has taken
place).
69. Unif. Adoption Act § 14, 9 U.L.A. 44 (1971).
70. In an Ohio case, the parents who adopted a child were told by the agency
that he was a normal, healthy baby. Later the parents discovered that the child
was born to a mental patient in a psychiatric institution. The boy was retarded and
had numerous physical and psychological problems. The adoptive parents were
awarded $125,000 in damages to cover medical expenses and extra care for the
child. Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 23 Ohio St. 3d 69, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (1986).
71. In a well-publicized Minnesota murder trial, Lois Jurgens, an adoptive
mother, was found to have killed her adopted son. The birthmother asked the state
agency to investigate after she learned that the child she had placed for adoption
twenty-three years before had died at age three. St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch,
May 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1. It is doubtful that the birthmother could bring a civil ac-




often obtained under conditions that do not lend themselves to ra-
tional decision-making. 72
D. Sealing the Birth Records
Birth records are sealed by the court after the adoption de-
cree is finalized. Maintaining the secrecy of adoption records origi-
nally mirrored the secrecy sought by the unmarried birthmother
who sequestered herself during the pregnancy to hide her dis-
grace.73 Though pregnancy outside marriage is no longer viewed
in such a harsh way by society, records are still closed for public
policy reasons to assure privacy rights of the parties. 74 The major
concern of courts which receive petitions to open court records
concerning adoption is the issue of invasion of privacy. As a conse-
quence, birth records are seldom made accessible to any of the par-
ties to the contract unless the judge determines that there is good
cause for the disclosure.75
Eighteen years or more after the adoption procedure is com-
pleted, a new chapter may begin for the adoptee: the search for
confidential birth records. The success of the state in guarding
this "private" information from idle or malevolent curiosity-seek-
ers also serves to barricade the adult adoptee from a background
story which is rightfully hers. The next section focuses on what
many adoptees must endure to acquire personal information which
belongs to them.
VI. The Trials of the Adult Adoptee
I sent her a Polaroid photo taken in December. She wrote
back: "You have an uncanny resemblance to one of his daughters.
People would know whose daughter you are." That moment, my
world was irrevocably altered. No longer disembodied, I felt a
physical connection to someone else. I share my eyes, my hair
72. Paton, supra note 7.
73. Dukette, supra note 18, at 236.
74. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. Statutes which prohibit re-
lease of adoption information contained in court records may not apply to informa-
tion obtained through other channels. See Jordan v. Pensacola News-Journal, 314
So. 2d 222, 223-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (statute prohibiting release of court
records pertaining to adoption proceeding not applicable to publication of informa-
tion received from other sources). If adoption statutes are inapplicable, a person
may have a cause of action in tort. See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 68 Or.
App. 573, 582, 684 P.2d 581, 587 (1983) (a doctor who released hospital records to an
adopted child he delivered twenty years before was liable for breach of confidential
relationship with the birthmother), aff'd in part and rev'd in part en banc, 298 Or.
706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985).
75. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
1988]
Law and Inequality
color, my body shape with another person. Unlike Eve I am not
the beginning of my line. I began to accept my body, my appear-
ance. For the first time. But I wonder, will I ever meet her, my
sister-of-the-body?
For most adopted people, beginning the search for their
birthparents is a struggle. It is difficult on an emotional level
(What will I find? Will 1 be turned away?), and it is discouraging
on a procedural level because of numerous legal barriers that must
be overcome. Many adopted people find themselves in court early
in the process, having to prove that they have a good reason for
asking to see their birth records. The majority of courts seem an-
noyed with suits by adoptees and deal with their petitions harshly.
But there is a gathering opposition, and adopted adults should take
heart that before long there will be some legal precedent for
granting access to confidential birth information. At present, how-
ever, the path to self-enlightenment is fraught with obstacles for
the adult adoptee.
A. Gaining Access to Birth Records Through the
Courtroom
The rules with respect to judicial proceedings for opening
adoption records vary from state to state. Three basic procedures
are applied.76 The most open method permits adopted adults ac-
cess to their birth records without consulting any other parties.
77
Another process allows access to confidential information when
the adopted adult and the birth parents both consent to the mu-
tual exchange. 78 This is usually handled through an adoption
agency.
76. The legislative history of adoption in Louisiana provides a short course in
these various approaches and exemplifies the tightening of restrictions with respect
to access. As of 1938 records were open to all the parties on demand. Beginning in
1942, a court order was required for adoptive parents or adoptees to gain access to
records. Birthparents were excluded from obtaining a court order. In 1977 the law
changed once again so that records were only opened upon compelling reason
shown by adoptees or adoptive parents. See Chambers v. Parker, 349 So. 2d 424,
425-26 (La. 1977).
77. See supra note 2. An earlier version of the Model State Adoption Act pro-
vided the same open access to birthparents.
Section 502 (d), Birth CertTsctes-An original birth certificate, sealed
pursuant to this section, shall at any time be opened as a matter of
right to the birthparent whose rights were terminated or to the adult
adoptee upon application to the Office of Vital Statistics. The appli-
cant shall be provided a true copy of the original certificate, without
official certification and bearing a notation that the original certificate
has been amended.
Jayne Askin with Bob Oskam, Search 8 (1982).
78. National Committee for Adoption, supra note 1, at 93. Some states have es-
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The third and most restrictive method requires a court hear-
ing at which all parties are represented and are given notice and
an opportunity to be heard.79 If birthparents cannot be found by
the court, a guardian ad litem is appointed to represent their inter-
ests.8 0 At the hearing, the person petitioning for access to infor-
mation must prove that she has "good cause" for searching.8 ' The
process is so byzantine that even when adoptive parents and
birthparents have given full consent to having the court records
opened to the adoptee, the court may still require an investigation
into good cause.8
2
tablished voluntary adoption registries to facilitate contact, the approach favored by
the National Committee for Adoption. Id.
79. Birthparents may be necessary parties and should be notified of any petition
for release of confidential information. In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 225, 399
N,Y.S.2d 857, 858 (Sur. Ct. 1977). In Louisiana, a curator is appointed to look at the
court records to aid in determining if the birthparents are necessary parties to the
proceeding. See Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1315 (La. 1979). The adopted
person is not allowed to examine the birth record to determine the validity of her
claim but must rely on the decision of the curator. Kirsh v. Parker, 383 So. 2d 384,
387 (La. 1980); Stahel v. Brown, 422 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Louisiana
has statutes which permit an adopted person to inherit from both adoptive parents
and birthparents. As a result, there is substantial adoption litigation in Louisiana
where adopted adults have their potential inheritance as a reason for searching.
In other states, investigation of court records is left to the judge or other court
personnel, rather than to an outside administrator. In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151,
159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). When an extensive search is necessary to find the
birthparents, however, the notice requirement may be waived. In re Linda F.M., 92
Misc. 2d 828, 831, 401 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (Sur. Ct. 1978).
80. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383,
1390 (R.I. 1986). The guardian ad litem must oppose the adoptee's petition because
"it must be presumed that it is in [the birthparents'] interest to keep the records
sealed." In re Hayden, 106 Misc. 2d 849, 851, 437 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981). The court reasoned that the statute was written, not to protect the adoptee,
but to protect the anonymity of birthparents, the implication being that
birthparents desire anonymity.
81. See iykfra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
Even if the adoptee is able to show good cause, many courts will use their own
discretion to determine a remedy "short of full disclosure." In re George, 625
S.W.2d 151, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). In one case, the adoptee was given an option of
reviewing all medical information with the identifying information redacted or ob-
taining a medical history through the guardian ad litem who would continue to cor-
respond with the birthparents. Golan v. Louise Wise Servs., 69 N.Y.2d 343, 349, 507
N.E.2d 276, 279, 514 N.Y.S.2d 682, 686 (1987).
The showing of good cause may precede giving notice to birthparents in order
to save the birthparents from being disturbed unnecessarily if the adoptee fails in
her burden of proof to show good cause. In re Romano, 109 Misc. 2d 99, 105, 438
N.Y.S.2d 967, 972 (Sur. Ct. 1981).
New Jersey's burden of proof standard differs from that of other states. Before
the age of majority, an adoptee bears the burden of proof in demonstrating good
cause. When the adoptee becomes an adult, however, the burden of proof shifts to
the state. The state must show why good cause is not present in the petition. Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 317-18, 372 A.2d 646,
654 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
82. In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 225, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
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B. The "Good Cause" Requirement
In states which require a judicial hearing in order to open
confidential birth records, the petitioner must prove that she has
an important reason for asking the court to make an exception to
state adoption statutes. The courts, as guardians of the state's in-
terest in individual privacy, are rigid in their adherence to the
good cause requirement.8 3 Adult adoptees, however, may claim
certain property and liberty interests in their birth information.
8 4
A birth certificate with vital information left blank is an example
of deprivation of personal property of adult adoptees, property
which without question is given to and belongs to non-adopted peo-
ple. All citizens have access to their vital statistics, and akin to
that, own a kind of possessory interest in their family background.
No one would question a non-adopted person's freedom to research
their geneology and develop a family tree to share with future gen-
erations. The opposite is true for adult adoptees who are denied
the basic freedom of finding out, not only their family heritage,
but also an essential piece of their own identity. It is noteworthy
that the courts are so assiduous in protecting the alleged privacy
rights of a small section of the population when rights to liberty
and property are expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. When
a state's interest collides with the liberty interest of the individual,
the state's interest must yield. Not so in the case of adoption,
where the information that adult adoptees desire is held to be
neither a liberty nor a property interest.
8 5
There are few considerations courts accept as good cause. A
significant need to obtain medical information is one.s8 The right
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Even if good cause is shown the
court still has the right to restrict the amount of information the adoptee receives.
For example, no identifying information is released unless all of the parties con-
sent. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978).
84. See In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1070, 407 N.E.2d 884, 893 (1980)
(Rizzi, J., dissenting) (the right to know the identity of one's genetic parents is a
private and personal right guaranteed by the ninth amendment).
85. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text regarding the adoptee's con-
stitutional right to information.
86. See In re Rocci, 96 A.D.2d 743, 743, 465 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (1983)
(birthmother who wishes to pass along important medical information may do so
upon showing good cause); In re Chattman, 57 A.D.2d 618, 619, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768,
768-69 (1977) (fear of genetic defects is good cause). But see In re George, 625
S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (adoptee in need of bone marrow transplant was
denied names of birthparents, but court administrator was instructed to contact
birthparents and ask if they would be willing to participate in surgery anony-
mously); Golan v. Louise Wise Servs., 69 N.Y.2d 343, 507 N.E.2d 275, 514 N.Y.S.2d
682 (1987). In the Golan case, a commercial pilot was laid off until he could find
medical history from birthparents to explain his heart disease and heart attack. In
denying this adoptee access to his medical records the court rationalized: "A rule
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to inherit property is another.8 7 Some jurisdictions have held that
treatment of severe psychological disorders is also good cause for
releasing birth records.88 However, mere curiosity, interest in the
which automatically [gives] full disclosure to any adopted person confronted with a
medical problem with some genetic implications [will] swallow New York's strong
policy against disclosure as soon as adopted people [reach] middle age." Id. at 349,
507 N.E.2d at 279, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
87. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979); Prentice v. Parker, 376
So. 2d 568, 571 (La. Ct. App. 1979). The dilemma, of course, is that the adopted
adult has no idea and receives no notification of a birthparent's death until it is too
late. Not all courts are convinced that inheritance is a compelling reason to open
birth records. Adopted children are not the "issue" of biological family after they
are placed for adoption. In re Estate of Best, 66 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 485 N.E.2d 1010,
1013, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986). Furthermore, a
mere expectation of a right to inherit is not sufficient good cause to open records.
Aimone v. Finley, 113 Ill. App. 3d 507, 509, 447 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1983), appeal dis-
missed, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984).
88. See In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 226, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (Sur. Ct.
1977) (adoptee was a "deeply troubled young man"); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383,
1386 (R.I. 1986) (psychological need to know must be severe). But see Mills v. At-
lantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 319, 372 A.2d 646, 655 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (psychological need showing that there is a continued
sense of unreality in the adoptee's self-image is sufficient good cause).
Contra In re Dixon, 116 Mich. App. 763, 771, 323 N.W.2d 549, 552-53 (1982) (se-
vere psychological illness not good cause because it seemed to be rooted in adoptee's
troubled adoptive home as opposed to resulting from a need to learn of her iden-
tity). In the Dixon case, the adoptee's psychiatrist wrote the following letter to the
court:
"It has been my experience that there is generally a deep-seated need
on the part of adoptees to know their biological origins, regardless of
the quality of family life in their adopted families. This desire does
not necessarily manifest itself in a wish to form a relationship with
their family of origin, but a need to know something of their biological
origins. Conversely, I have seen a parallel desire on the part of natu-
ral parents to know something of the lives of their biological children.
Preventing this information from being available when requested by
either party only encourages doubt and uncertainty based on fantasy
on the part of children and guilt on the part of the natural parents.
"I have seen Carolyn Dixon in intensive psychotherapy since August
of 1979. She is suffering from a severe depressive illness which has
manifested itself in several near lethal suicide attempts and has re-
quired two hospitalizations. At present her condition remains
guarded. This depression, in fact, has its origins in the severe emo-
tional deprivation she suffered in her adopted family. This deprivation
and abuse prevented the establishment of the intimacy and security
normally expected of a family which allows for healthy psychological
development and the establishment of a secure identity. At present
Mrs. Dixon is desperately trying to establish a secure psychological
base. The denial of access to her adoption records will only be exper-
ienced as further deprivation and therefore have a negative impact on
her condition. It is my opinion that the release of this information is
in the interest of Carolyn's recovery from her depression."
Id. at 766 n.2, 323 N.W.2d at 550 n.2. Although the psychiatrist spoke sensitively
about the needs of adoptees and birthparents with respect to birth information, his
statement was not enough to persuade the Michigan court to release identifying in-
formation to the adoptee.
It is unfortunate that an adoptee must reveal such intimate details of her life in
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past, or a desire to know one's origin, without medical or inheri-
tance reasons pleaded as well, is not sufficient to establish good
cause.8 9
The typical adult adoptee who seeks access to birth records is
searching in order to satisfy an interest in her background. Fur-
ther, she is not suffering from significant physical or mental
problems. As a consequence, the good cause requirement serves to
withhold from the adult adoptee vital information about her iden-
tity.90 The real paradox of the good cause approach is that the
healthier and more well-adjusted the adult adoptee is, the less
likely she is to gain access to confidential information.9 1
C. Judicial Hostility Toward Suits by Adoptees
From reading the many opinions which follow petitions by
adoptees, it appears that many judges feel that suits by adoptees
are frivolous and a waste of the court's time. The adult adoptee is
treated like an ungrateful child or a rebellious malcontent.92 One
an effort to convince a court that her psychological need to know is concrete. One
wonders here if she told too much. Perhaps, the court was afraid to release identi-
fying information to someone it deemed too unstable to act responsibly.
It appears that it is difficult to describe the need to know in words persuasive
enough to convince a court that it is good cause to open birth records. This indi-
cates that it may be nearly impossible for those who have knowledge of their own
parentage and family history to know how an adoptee experiences the absence of
this information. Most people, including judges and lawmakers, have the privilege
of knowing their roots and, as a result, take this self-knowledge for granted.
89. Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 240, 418 N.E.2d 1302,
1304, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981); In re Romano, 109
Misc. 2d 99, 104, 438 N.Y.S.2d 967, 971 (Sur. Ct. 1981). See also In re Christine, 121
R.I. 203, 207, 397 A.2d 511, 513 (1979) (interest in her child's welfare alone was not
sufficient good cause to open birth records to a birthmother). The position that a
need to know is not sufficient good cause contradicts widespread expert opinion
that "the need to be connected with one's biological and historical past is an inte-
gral part of one's identity formation." Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at
219.
Maturity is not a factor to consider in weighing good cause. Courts do not
equate adulthood with good cause for desiring birth information. In re Roger B., 85
Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1069-70, 407 N.E.2d 884, 889 (1980), aff'd, 84 Ill. 2d 323, 418 N.E.2d
751, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981); In re Romano, 109 Misc. 2d 99, 103, 438
N.Y.S.2d 967, 971 (Sur. Ct. 1981).
A Mormon wishing to trace his ancestry as one of the tenets of his faith met
with court resistance. The case was remanded for more facts and the lower court
was instructed to be aware of preferential treatment of one religious group over an-
other. In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1978).
90. After conducting a study of twins at the University of Minnesota, psycholo-
gist David Lykken remarked: "[We have a] strong sense that vastly more of human
behavior is genetically determined or influenced than we ever supposed." Askin,
supra note 77, at 14.
91. See Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 275 S.C. 622, 629, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422
(1981).
92. Several courts still apply the best interests of the child standard to adult
[Vol. 6:185
ADOPTION CONTRACTS
judge articulated his heartfelt disapproval succinctly:
[I]t should be stated that adoptive parents need and deserve
the child's loyalty as they grow older and particularly in their
later years. The statute promotes a posture from which the
child's attention and emotional attachments are directed to-
ward the relationship with the new parents and so it should
be.9 3
The conclusions reached by many judges seem to reflect this
position.
The hostility of the courts is out of line with the facts about
adult adoptees. Most adopted adults are as mature, loving, and at-
tentive to their parents as the rest of the general population. The
adopted people who choose to search more often describe their
childhoods as difficult in comparison to non-searchers, but there is
no indication that they are making the search to punish their
adoptive parents or their birthparents. 94 The overwhelming reason
that adopted people search is to enlighten themselves about the
darkness of the past.
D. The Search
Even after the struggle to gain access to birth records, the
adopted person has just begun the search for answers to her ques-
tions. The search itself is often long and arduous.
There have been numerous studies to determine the motiva-
tions of adopted adults who choose to search for their birthparents.
Some search in order to supplement the background information
in court or adoption agency files.9 5 Inaccurate medical history pro-
vides one example of the need to follow up. Much of this informa-
tion is woefully outdated in the birth records themselves because
few birthparents take advantage of the opportunity to update the
files as the family medical history changes over time.96
Other adoptees follow the suggestions of counselors who urge
them to obtain more information in order to come to terms with
the earliest experience of abandonment. One of the basic ques-
tions that adopted children ask is: "Why did my mother give me
adoptees' petitions to open birth records. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Spinks, 32
N.C. App. 422, 429, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1977). The language used in referring to the
adult petitioner as a child reflects the absurd paternalistic attitude held by the
courts toward adoptees, regardless of the adoptees' ages.
93. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Mo. 1978). Here too the judge refers to
the adult as a child. Apparently the judge recommends that each adoptee wait un-
til both adoptive parents have died before beginning a search for origins. Id. at 763.
94. See infra note 99 and accompanying text regarding dissatisfaction as moti-
vation of search.
95. Askin, supra note 77, at 15; Sobol & Cardiff, supra note 46, at 480.
96. Askin, supra note 77, at 16.
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away?" 97 As an adult the question still remains to be answered.
Some adoptees are looking for birth siblings in order to compare
talents, preferences, and appearances. One study indicated that
searching behavior in adults was linked to dissatisfaction in the
adoptive home.98 Other studies have indicated that searchers tend
to come from socially liberal families.99 Other factors include
sex,1 ° age of child at the time she found out she was adopted,lx
and general satisfaction with life as an adult.102 Whatever the rea-
sons for searching, many adopted people experience difficulty in
tracking down both birthparents. Even searches conducted by the
courts through a special administrator in order to serve notice on
the birthparents may take a long time and often delay the hear-
ings for months.
Of course, it is never clear what awaits the adopted person at
the end of the search. Adoption search organizations report that
most reunions between adoptees and birthparents are highly suc-
cessful.l0 3 Sometimes parents and children meet, exchange sto-
ries, and part ways without further plans for reunions. Others
become intimate with each other's families. The experiences vary
97. Many adoptees suffer from a poor self-image, having internalized adoption
as rejection by the birthparent. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 213;
Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 118; Sobol & Cardiff, supra note 46, at
480.
98. Sue Aumend & Marjie Barrett, Self-Concept and Attitudes Toward Adop-
tion A Comparison of Searching and Nonsearching Adult Adoptees, 63 Child Wel-
fare 251, 254 (1984).
99. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 214.
100. Most searchers are female. Some researchers have hypothesized that more
women search because they have a heightened interest in pregnancy, women are
often more in touch with their feelings, women identify more with the mother fig-
ure, and more women are interested in geneology and maintaining kinship ties.
Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 196.
101. Sobol & Cardiff, supra note 46, at 479. Cf. Aumend & Barrett, supra note
98, at 253. A related factor is that the older the child at the age of adoption, the
more likely she is to search as an adult. Sobol & Cardiff, supra note 46, at 479.
102. Those who are more dissatisfied are more apt to search. Aumend & Barrett,
supra note 98, at 257; Sobol & Cardiff, supra note 46, at 480.
103. In a study of 50 randomly selected adoptees in 1975, 90% of all adoptees
were satisfied with the results of their reunions. Eighty-two percent of
birthparents felt favorably about the outcome. Ten percent of all participants re-
acted adversely to the reunion. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 195.
Unfortunately, the secret nature of adoptions makes gathering statistical evi-
dence extremely difficult. Researchers have limited means of finding large num-
bers of adoptees and birthmothers, since their identities are carefully hidden. Most
of the statistics mentioned in this paper are derived from studies involving a rela-
tively small number of participants who have volunteered their names to research-
ers. If birth records become more accessible, it will be easier to conduct research
regarding the effects of adoption on all parties to the triangle. Such information
would undoubtedly be of great value to lawmakers and social scientists, and is an
important example of how the general public may benefit, as well, from opening
birth records.
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considerably, depending upon expectations, preparation for the
meeting, and the needs of each of the parties. 0 4
E. Winds of Change: Dissent on the Bench
Though there are few opinions that deal sympathetically with
the needs of adult adoptees who desire access to their birth
records, more dissenting judges have begun to recognize the
adoptee's need to know as a valid legal claim. These judges weight
the interests of the adult adoptee more heavily than those of other
parties to the contract:
[T]he compelling need of the child-born through the laws of
nature and of God to his blood parents, divested of his parents
through no choice of his own, innocent of any blame whatso-
ever-must always outweigh those interests of the parents to
hide from their child and others the unalterable fact of their
parentage through which they brought into this world their
child.105
Several justices advocate relaxing the good cause require-
ment.106 One judge remarked that the current good cause stan-
dard "treat[s] [adoptees] perpetually as children who must be
shielded from the truth."'1 7 In fact, it is the adoptive parents and
birthparents who are treated like children; they are the ones who
are protected from reality by a legislative shield. The good cause
requirement may serve its purpose in protecting minor adoptees
and their families from unwelcome intrusion by a birthparent, but
the requirement is unnecessary when all the parties are adults.
The dissenting judges are ahead of their time in advocating
the rights of adult adoptees. Four dissenting opinions by state
court judges in the last ten years, however, does not establish a
trend. Currently, they stand alone as judicial advocates for
adoptees in search of personal information. Still, their voices offer
guidance to the decision-makers of the future. Even as state legis-
lators are slow in altering the laws regarding secrecy in adoption,
courts in the years ahead should become more active in protecting
the rights of this important minority.
104. Id. at 196.
105. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979) (Tate, J., dissenting). See also
In re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1073, 407 N.E.2d 884, 893 (1980) (Rizzi, J., dis-
senting) (compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of the adopted child
ends when the child becomes an adult).
106. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 767-78 (Mo. 1978) (Seiler, J., concur-
ring in result); Golan v. Louise Wise Servs., 69 N.Y.2d 343, 351, 507 N.E.2d 275, 280,
514 N.Y.S.2d 682, 688-89 (1987) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
107. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 768 (Seiler, J., concurring in result).
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VII. The Adoption Contract Revisited
My mother did not believe me when I told her my earliest
memory. "You were carrying me down some wide stairs into a big
dark room. Daddy was standing next to you, and there was a big
desk. You and Daddy were facing the big desk and there was a
strange man in black looking at me. That's all I remember, except
that it was so cold and dark in there." My mother shook her head,
"That was the day we legally finalized the adoption. But you can't
possibly remember that. You were only sixteen months old."
An examination of the sociological background of adoption
belies many of the public policy concerns of lawmakers and judges.
Following is a discussion of the legal problems inherent in the con-
cept of the adoption contract. The legal incongruities are inevita-
ble because of the mistaken assumptions underlying the rules
governing adoptions.
A. Adoption Contracts and Surrogate Mother Contracts
Of late, surrogate contracts have received a great deal of pub-
lic attention following the tragic battle between William Stern and
Mary Beth Whitehead for custody of the child called Baby M by
the court. Each of the parties took on archetypal significance in
the public imagination. The Sterns became the couple who so des-
perately wanted a child, but for medical reasons could not or
should not conceive themselves. Adoptive parents everywhere
could identify with their need. Mary Beth Whitehead was the
birthmother who changed her mind. How many birthmothers
across the country wept when they heard her story? And little
Baby M was the child that everyone wanted, the baby who was, ul-
timately, never adopted.108
In In re Baby M, Superior Court Judge Sorkow thoroughly
analysed the surrogate mother contract and decided the contract
was valid.109 The Supreme Court of New Jersey overturned the
decision but awarded custody to William Stern using a best inter-
est of the child standard.110 The supreme court found the surro-
gate mother contract unenforceable because it involved adoption
through private placement and coercion of the mother to relin-
108. Elizabeth Stern was not permitted to adopt Baby M because Mary Beth
Whitehead refused to consent to the baby's adoption. William Stern who got cus-
tody of the child did not need to adopt Baby M since he was her natural father. In
re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 411, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (1988).
109. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
110. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
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quish her parental rights."' Furthermore, the court held that the
surrogate mother contract prematurely determined custody of the
child before a court had an opportunity to decide what was in the
child's best interest.ii 2
If the New Jersey Supreme Court's objections to the surro-
gate contract seem at odds with the results in adoption cases, it is
because courts continue to view surrogate contracts differently
from adoption contracts.1 13 The differences, however, are subtle.
In many respects, the two contracts closely resemble each other.
In both contracts, a biological mother relinquishes rights to the
child she carried for nine months and to whom she gave birth. All
parties to the contract suffer the stress of uncertainty. The
birthmother wonders about the well-being of the child and wres-
tles with a desire to keep the baby. The adoptive parents remain
anxious that the birthmother will decide to keep the child after
all.ll4
The surrogate contracts must be drafted very carefully to
avoid the appearance and impropriety of baby-selling."i5 In most
adoptions, money changes hands, but this is viewed as a legitimate
processing fee by agencies or private attorneys who handle adop-
tions. Rather than buying the child, adoptive parents, including
those hiring a surrogate mother, are said to be paying for medical
expenses and/or the efforts of the mother and the placement
agency."i 6
When disputes arise between the parties in surrogacy and
adoption cases, a court may review contracts by analyzing what is
in the best interests of the child.ll7 Such a review is misguided be-
111. Id. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
112. Id. at 427, 537 A.2d at 1242.
113. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Ass'n v. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky.
1986); In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 438, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988)
114. One commentator contends that surrogate mother contracts should be inva-
lid because of the terrible stress to the parties involved. Peter Bronley, Aided Con-
ception: The Alternative to Adoption, in Adoption 174, 192 (Philip Bean ed. 1984).
Interestingly, he does not discuss the potential for stress to the child of the
contract.
115. See Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 213. When the mother signs away rights to
her child in exchange for money, the contract is unenforceable, however, a custody
contract between parents is enforceable. See generally Hutton Brown, Surrogate
Parenting: A Quagmire of Legal Issues, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 597, 649 (1986). One com-
mentator argues that surrogacy is nothing like adoption because it is "reproductive
prostitution." Pollitt, supra note 33, at 684.
116. See Avi Katz, Surrogacy, 20 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 21 (1986).
117. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 323, 525 A.2d 1128, 1132 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
When the adoption arrangement is done for the best interest of the child and not
for the monetary reward of the mother, then the contract is valid. Brown, supra
note 115, at 646.
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cause the adoption contract and the surrogate mother contract are
written in the best interests of the parents, and in particular the
adoptive parents, who are often the only ones represented by an
attorney."i8
Arguments that have arisen in recent months concerning the
validity of surrogate mother contracts can be applied with equal
rigor to the adoption contract, because surrogacy and adoption are
sister relationships. As the courts begin to wrangle with the new
ethical dilemmas posed by the surrogate contract,"i 9 the time is
ripe for adoptees to draw the analogy to the fundamental unfair-
ness of the adoption contract which has been held sacrosanct for so
many years. By engaging in this comparative analysis, the courts
and state legislatures may also realize the need for reform of adop-
tion laws.
B. The Problem with Contract Analysis
The law of contracts embraces several areas of domestic rela-
tions. Antenuptial agreements, contracts between married couples
regarding property divisions, dissolution agreements, surrogate
mother contracts, and adoption contracts represent some contem-
porary examples. In spite of the union of contract and family law,
contracts which involve family relationships are fundamentally
different in character from commercial contracts. A transaction
between husband and wife which is formalized in writing is gener-
ally not presumed to be at arm's length unless certain precautions
are taken to assure fairness. 20 The relationships between family
members are intimate ones, and regulating the conduct of intimate
relations with commercial contract law can lead to discordant re-
sults. Contracts between family members aim to promote domes-
tic peace and harmonious living, not simply to regulate the
exchange of goods and services between the parties.
This was the dilemma Judge Sorkow faced when he applied
commercial contract law to the relationship between the Sterns
and Mrs. Whitehead. Using commercial contract analysis, the sur-
118. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 313, 525 A.2d at 1128.
119. The ethical issues include: Does a contract for a baby diminish the concept
of family? Should an unwilling mother be forced to give up her baby? Who does
society recognize as the primary parents? Should unmarried couples procreate arti-
ficially to create a child for the male? Is the "surrogate child" deprived when ac-
cess to the biological mother is denied? Should society allow the exchange of
money for the creation of human life? See generally Katz, supra note 116.
120. For example, the antenuptial contract is not enforceable unless there is full
disclosure of assets and liabilities, spousal support provisions remain intact, and
both parties execute the agreement voluntarily. See Unif. Premarital Agreement
Act § 6, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1983).
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rogate mother contract appeared to be valid. The result, however,
was harsh, and the reviewing court overturned Judge Sorkow's de-
cision.121 When adoption contracts are treated as commercial con-
tracts, the same problems arise. Contrary to decisions against
surrogate mother contracts, no higher court has overturned a case
involving rights to birth information on the ground that the adop-
tion contract is invalid or on the ground that the results of the se-
crecy are harsh.
C The Child as a Party to the Adoption Contract
In his painstaking review of the Baby M surrogate contract,
Judge Sorkow refuted a number of arguments against the con-
tract, including unconscionability,122 adhesion,123 fraud and du-
ress,124 illusory effect, 125 third-party beneficiary,126 child as
chattel,127 and provisions contrary to public policy.128 Despite his
careful analysis, the judge never decided one of the most basic is-
sues of contracts involving children: Was the child a party to the
contract? Judge Sorkow may have deliberately avoided the ques-
tion because a definitive answer would have undermined the basis
of both surrogate mother and adoption contracts.
Assuming the child is a party to the contract, then the terms
of the contract would be binding on the child. However, the child
is a minor, and therefore unable to contract. This suggests the
child is not a party to the contract, yet the child is raised under the
terms of the contract. Her life is irrevocably changed because of
the contract. The child is treated as a quasi-party to the contract.
As a consequence of being adopted, the child is forever sepa-
rated from her birthparents. Perhaps more significantly, the child
is denied knowledge of any of the circumstances surrounding her
birth, including information about her biological parents and sib-
lings. The adoption contract binds the parties, including the child,
in secrecy. Considering the serious nature of the contract and the
fact that the terms are binding on the child, the problems of the
surrogate mother contract, as exemplified in the Baby M case reso-
nate in the adoption contract.
121. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
122. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 376, 525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 379, 525 A.2d at 1161.
125. Id. at 304, 525 A.2d at 1163.
126. Id. at 400-01, 525 A.2d at 1171-72.
127. Id. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
128. Id. at 372-73, 525 A.2d 1157-58.
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The child is not represented by an attorney at an uncontested
adoption hearing. Instead, the judge is said to act in the child's be-
half as parens patriae. 29 Furthermore, "[n]o court in the nation
has granted the adoptee child a right to counsel.' 130 The same is
true in the negotiation of a surrogate mother contract, and it is not
until the contract is contested that a guardian ad litem is ap-
pointed by the court to represent the independent interest of the
infant.'13 That interest might be defined in a number of ways: ac-
cess to identifying information about the birthmother after a cer-
tain age, specified age of disclosure about the circumstances of
birth, establishing a reunion date between the child and mother at
a certain time, and perhaps even visitation rights. These points of
negotiation are different from the best interests of the adoptive
parents and the birthparents, yet the child has no one to argue for
protection of her rights at the time the contract is settled.
3 2
Ironically, some states have laws which permit birth records
to remain open if one of the parties requests it at the adoption pro-
ceeding.133 Without a guardian ad litem to make such a request,
the infant adoptee is unlikely to be able to take advantage of this
opportunity. At present, few adoptive parents are apt to request
open birth records, especially while the child is a minor.
In a court of equity, a contract may be held invalid if one
party lacks representation and the issues involved in the contract
revolve around life, liberty, or property. 3 4 Access to one's birth
129. In re Dixon, 116 Mich. App. 763, 772-73, 323 N.W.2d 549, 553 (1982). Parens
patriae literally means parent of the country. It refers to the state as a sovereign,
which acts as a guardian of those citizens who are unable to fend for themselves.
Black's Law Dictionary 579 (5th ed. 1983). The question remains: How can the state
protect the child's interest in her birth information when those interests are in di-
rect conflict with the state's express interest that adoption records be sealed? See
also In re Adoption of Female Infant, 237 A.2d 468, 469 (D.C. 1968).
130. In re Dixon, 116 Mich. App. at 772, 323 N.W.2d at 553.
131. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 327-28, 525 A.2d 1128, 1135 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
The identity of a person must be known before a guardian ad litem can be ap-
pointed. This effectively leaves the child-to-be without legal protection during con-
tract negotiations. NACAC v. Department of Social and Health Servs., 108 Wash.
2d 433, 441, 739 P.2d 677, 681 (1987).
132. Hoggett, supra note 4, at 135.
133. In re William Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 807-09, 586 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (1979).
These provisions have probably been drafted to allow adopted stepchildren and peo-
ple adopted as adults to retain access to their own birth records.
134. See Hoggett, supra note 4, at 135 (the child may be very much in need of
someone to represent her interest alone). See also Carol Amadio & Stuart Deutsch,
Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to "Stay in Touch".with Blood Rela-
tives, 22 J. Fam. L. 59, 86 (1983-1984) (a guardian ad litem is essential to negotia-
tions in an open adoption). Contra In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. at 377, 525 A.2d
at 1160 (there is no rule of contract which states that parties must be represented in
order to contract legally).
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records, an assumed right of non-adopted people but a "privilege"
denied adoptees, is arguably both a liberty and a property interest
for the adopted person. Babies who are not represented at the
time the contract is signed grow to adulthood bound by the terms
of a contract that prevents them from gaining access to fundamen-
tal facts about their own existence.
1 35
Arguments concerning adhesion, unconscionability, duress,
and illusory effect are all connected to the same basic facts about
adoption. A vulnerable child is denied the right to know about her
past in order to provide secirity and privacy to mature adults. Yet
it is the adults who have all the resources of the legal system to
enforce their own privacy rights. They do not need the special
protection of the adoption contract. The child, on the other hand,
has no guardian to represent her. As an adult, the adopted person
must overcome a nearly impossible legal burden to gain access to
her birth information. 136 She is further disadvantaged in her
search by the length of time that the records have remained
sealed. Lawmakers and judges have cooperated in creating an im-
penetrable legal shield that protects birthparents and adoptive par-
ents. It is undoubtedly the adoptive parents who receive the great
benefit of the contract. They receive a child to love and parent.
The birthmother may benefit as well, but her right to privacy
comes with a penalty: She is completely severed from her infant.
This inherent inequality of power between the parties to the
contract raises questions about the validity of the terms of the
adoption contract. A contract is unconscionable when the terms of
the contract are oppressive to one party. 3 7 In any contract, there
is an assumption of risk by one party.138 In the adoption contract
it is the infant adoptee, without benefit of counsel, who assumes
the greatest risk-the burden of the secret. In the negotiation pro-
cess the child is treated like an orphan by the other parties. They
presume one should be grateful to give up one's heritage in ex-
change for winning the tender loving care of another set of par-
ents, as if the two options are mutually exclusive.13 9 The trade-off
may have had some validity during an era in which illegitimate
births were a matter of shame for mothers, children, and families
135. Jean Paton depicts the injustice of the situation graphically by describing an
ink print of a baby's foot with a caption underneath that reads, "Not in the con-
tract." Paton, supra note 7.
136. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
137. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 376, 525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
138. Id.




generally. In reality, illegitimacy does not carry the same social
and legal stigma as in the past. 140 The courts are overdue in
reevaluating the best interest of the adopted child by considering
the changing mores of contemporary society.
A contract is one of adhesion and invalid if a party to the con-
tract has no right to influence the terms of the contract, and there
are no other ways to obtain the product or service.i 41 The adopted
infant is not represented during contract negotiations and has no
bargaining power. Given the profound effect of the adoption con-
tract on the adoptee, the adoptee should be considered a party to
the contract. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the child to be
bound by the terms of the contract. The terms, which impose a
lifelong secrecy upon the adoptee, are not in the best interest of
the child, because the child later becomes an independent adult
whose need to know is different from her childhood need for se-
curity. The adoption contract is arguably an adhesion contact be-
cause the child, who may be considered a party to the contract and
is bound by its terms, has no opportunity to influence the terms,
either as an infant or as an adult. Furthermore, the infant adoptee
has a fundamental need for a loving home and family to nurture
her. To obtain this loving care, she has no alternatives but to ac-
cept the terms of the adoption contract.
Equitable fraud is defined as a misrepresentation of a mate-
rial fact that one has relied upon to one's detriment.' 42 Fraud is
commonly argued by birthmothers who have changed their minds
about the adoption process and wish to keep their babies.x43 The
argument might be used by adopted children as well.
A child has no option but to rely on adults to protect her in-
terests. Primarily because of the adoption contract, the child is
taught by well-meaning adults, including her parents, to live the
lie that knowledge about the past will only harm her happy home
life. Because adopted persons are treated as orphans by the law
and by society, the implication to the child is that the alternative
to her adoption is stark abandonment. 44 Such messages, direct
140. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimate children may
inherit from both mother and father); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974)
(illegitimate children are entitled to disability benefits of the father who would sup-
port them if he were able to work).
141. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 376, 525 A.2d at 1159.
142. Id. at 379, 525 A.2d at 1161.
143. See, e.g., In re Nolan, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1086-88, 419 N.E.2d 550, 554-56,
(1981). See also In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 425, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (1988) (the sur-
rogate agreement may be coercive to the mother because of the monetary incentive
to sell her child).
144. Contemporary Hansels and Gretels are rarely turned out into the woods to
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and subliminal, constitute duress, forcing the child to succumb to
the desires of her primary caretakers.145
In the end, the adopted child is a victim of fraud, duress, and
coercion made all the more poignant because the parties who are
misrepresenting the facts do so out of love for the infant. The fact
is that the adopted person never really feels complete until the
darkness of the past is brought to light.146 The misrepresentation
is that an adopted person should be able to feel free and fulfilled
without the knowledge of fundamental personal information.
A contract that assigns all benefits to one party and all obli-
gations to the other party is considered illusory and, therefore, in-
valid.147 An adoption contract is illusory because the child bears
the obligation to ignore the past, to obey the terms of the contract,
and not to search for confidential information about her
birthparents. Because many adoptive children harbor the fear that
if they disobey or disappoint their parents, they will be "sent
back," it is highly likely that they will take their obligations seri-
ously, often well into adulthood.148
Furthermore, the adoption contract does not provide the
child with any particular benefits. It is a basic view in most states
that all children deserve shelter, food, and protection. If these are
fundamental rights of children, then they cannot be called benefits
under an adoption contract. The adopted child receives only what
all children deserve, a home and a family.
Even assuming that the child benefits from the adoption con-
tract, the benefit of the contract diminishes as the child matures.
At a certain age, the adoptee becomes conscious of the mysterious
hole in her life story. At that point, the questions about her iden-
tity may create great insecurity in the adoptee. The needs of the
adopted adolescent are different from the needs of the adopted in-
fant. The security afforded the infant by the adoption contract ex-
acts a heavy price of insecurity from the adolescent adoptee.
fend for themselves. Unwanted children end up in foster care until they are placed
for adoption. There are some "special needs" children who are never adopted and
remain in the foster care system permanently. These are children who are difficult
to place because of their ethnic backgrounds, mental, physical or emotional handi-
caps, older ages, or their desire to remain with a group of siblings. National Com-
mittee for Adoption, supra note 1, at 41.
145. Fear of abandonment is common in adoptees, and this primal fear may play
an important part in the behavior of adopted children. See supra notes 40-46 and
accompanying text.
146. See infra note 188 regarding desires of adult adoptees to feel "complete".
147. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 384, 525 A.2d 1128, 1163 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
148. See supra note 41 and accompanying text regarding adoptees' concerns
about being "sent back".
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Similarly, the adult adoptee who no longer relies on the daily sup-
port of her adoptive family bears the full burden of the secret at
the heart of the adoption contract. In the end, adopted persons
carry all the obligations of the adoption contract which come to
outweigh any earlier benefits.
The problems that arise at the time the adoption contract
goes into effect are sufficient reason to invalidate the contract.
Even if one is willing to overlook the inherent difficulties at the
time of execution of the contract, the long-term effects are fatally
flawed. In time, the infant adoptee matures to adulthood. The se-
crecy that was once deemed in the best interest of the child is no
longer necessary, and may, in fact, be detrimental to her complete
development as an adult.149 Thus, the contract's purpose has been
frustrated.
A contract becomes invalid under the doctrine of frustration
when the contract's principal purpose cannot be fulfilled because
of unforeseeable changes in circumstance. 5 0 The needs of the par-
ents and children change with time. What those changes might
entail is not foreseeable at the time the contract is established.
One of the most astonishing things about the adoption contract is
that it purports to govern the entire lifetime of each of the parties.
The party whose needs alter most dramatically over time is
the adopted infant. The adoption contract becomes unenforcable
as the child becomes an adult with her own family, medical needs,
and personal goals. Many birthparents agree that after the child
has become an adult, the old contract has lost its meaning. They
are ready to meet their children, now mature persons and peers.'
5 '
There are numerous constitutional issues which have been
raised with respect to adoption contracts.15 2 The major constitu-
tional questions center around the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. It has been argued that adoptees are a suspect
class with immutable characteristics and that adult adoptees have
the right to acquire useful information.'5 3 It has also been as-
serted that closed birth records violate the thirteenth amendment
in that the good cause requirement is a badge of slavery.l54 Fur-
149. See supra note 36 and accompanying text regarding the identity conflicts of
adolescent adoptees.
150. "[W]hen a change in circumstances makes one party's performance virtually
worthless to the other," then the party is discharged of duties under the contract.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (1979).
151. Sorosky, Baran & Pamor, supra note 3, at 69.
152. See A.LMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd., 601
F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).




thermore, the good cause requirement has been claimed to be vio-
lative of the fourteenth amendment's procedural due process
guarantee. 5 5 Courts have not found the constitutional arguments
in themselves persuasive.156 However, in connection with other
contract arguments, the adoptee can call upon the Constitution to
seek both legal and equitable remedies to the problems caused by
confidential birth records.
If denying an individual access to vital personal information
is considered illegal in some respect, then the adoption contract it-
self must fail as contrary to public policy.157 So far no court has
been willing to go so far to protect the rights of adult adoptees.
The adoption contract which provides for sealing the child's
birth records permanently has a binding effect on birthparents,
adoptive parents, and the adopted child. Given the broad reach of
the contract and, in particular, its profound effect on the adoptee,
it can be argued that the infant is a party to the contract. If, how-
ever, this is the case, then numerous problems arise because the
child is without counsel, and the interests of the state conflict with
the interests of the adoptee. Hence, the child is bound by a con-
tract, but has never given consent to its terms. On reaching adult-
hood, the adoptee experiences the full force of the legal burden:
the initial chapter of her life story and the characters who peopled
her early life are locked away. The truth is hidden, because years
ago a court decreed it was in her "best interests."
D. The Child is Not a Party
Legal problems arise when a child is considered a party to the
adoption contract. An alternative argument may be made that the
child is not a party, but the contract is made to her benefit. This
creates a new legal question: is the child a beneficiary or a
chattel?
If the child, a minor, is not a party to the adoption contract,
some might argue that she is a beneficiary of the contract. In par-
ticular, the question of whether a third party has enforceable
rights under the contract is determined by the parties to the con-
155. See Askin, supra note 77, at 2-3. See also In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 771
(Mo. 1978) (no denial of due process).
156. See, e.g., Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912.
157. When courts characterize a contract as illegal, they generally mean the con-
tract is unenforceable on public policy grounds. A court has several options. It may
void the entire contract, it may hold that the offending provision of the contract is
unenforceable, or it may hold that the contract is unenforceable by one or both of
the parties. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 5.1 (1982).
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tract---did they intend to confer a benefit upon the third party.158
Since the basis of all court decisions about adoption has to do with
the best interests of the child, the law presumes the birthparents
and the adoptive parents intend to bestow a benefit upon the
adopted child. Indeed, if they were motivated by some other rea-
son, for instance a desire for financial gain, the contract would be
void.15 9
The question is, what benefits are given to the child through
the contract? The implication that a child receives benefits from
the adoption contract is deceptive. What the adopted child re-
ceives is only what all children need and rightfully deserve. It
would be a sad commentary on our society if it became necessary
for orphaned children to contract in order to receive the funda-
mental elements necessary for survival. This is the very essence of
parens patriae. Our child protection laws and social service agen-
cies were created to save children from being placed in such com-
promising situations.
Alternatively, the terms of the contract may be so construed
that they are not actually to the child's benefit, but rather to pro-
tect and hide the identities of the parties, the birthmother, and the
adoptive parents. However, if the terms of the contract serve only
to benefit the parents as parties, the child becomes a legal object of
the contract, a chattel. This is also problematic.
If the child is not a party or beneficiary to the contract, then
the child must be seen as the object of the contract.16 The danger
with this analysis is that a contract which treats the child as a
chattel is illegal under state baby-selling laws.161 Even if no
money changes hands at the contract closing, the mere fact that
the baby is treated as a piece of property raises questions of invol-
untary servitude and slavery, and the contract would be unen-
forceable for these reasons.1 62 Moreover, some adoptive parents
have expressed distaste with terms of the contract which bar their
child's access to birth records because they feel such a contract
158. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 400, 525 A.2d 1128, 1163 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
159. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
160. What actually happens in a surrogacy situation is that the biological father
pays the biological mother for the right to have his infertile wife adopt the child.
This violates Kentucky's baby-selling statute which forbids the purchase and sale of
children. Surrogate Parent Ass'n, Inc. v. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 215 (Ky. 1986)
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
161. Payment of money for a child denigrates human dignity. In re Baby M., 217
N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
162. The 13th amendment forbids dealing with human beings as property. Id.
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treats the child as chattel.163
One may discuss the unfairness and absurdity of the adoption
contract at length, but courts will continue to enforce it. Even
though the contract serves to shield the identities of the adults in-
volved in the contract, the courts still believe that they act primar-
ily in the best interests of the child. Lawmakers and judges have
been willing to overlook the many defects in the adoption contract
in order to encourage adoption, which is supposedly in the child's
best interest. The best interest of the child doctrine involves a
complex set of considerations that the judge must weigh in award-
ing legal custody of the child. In the case of adoption, the best in-
terest of the child has an added dimension: Access to the truth
about the child's parentage is often denied forever.
E. The Irony of the Best Interest of the Child Doctrine
The Child is father of the Man.164
The major problem with the best interest of the child doc-
trine as applied in adoption cases is that what appears to benefit
the adopted child is actually detrimental to the adult adoptee.
There is room for debate about whether secrecy truly is in the
child's best interest at all. Consequentially, many contemporary
adoptions are "open." 165  The birthparents, or at least the
birthmother, and the adoptive parents are acquainted with each
other, and the birthparents are allowed visitation with the child
while the adoptive parents retain full legal custody. Those in an
open adoption relationship hope that the child will experience less
painful abandonment feelings as she grows and avoid many of the
identity conflicts of adolescence. 66
The traditional adoption places an emphasis on maintaining a
secret of identity from the adoptee. For most adoptees, living with
this secret is living with a void. The confusion experienced by the
adopted child who has no answers to her questions about why she
was adopted becomes a hole in the self-image of the adult.16 7 Feel-
ings of inadequacy, lack of fulfillment in life, difficulties in inti-
mate relationships, and distrust of others in an adult adoptee can
163. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 118.
164. William Wordsworth, My Heart Leaps Up, in 1 The Poetical Works of Wil-
liam Wordsworth 226 (E. de Selincourt ed. 1967).
165. Dukette, supra note 18, at 240. See also infra note 208 and accompanying
text regarding open adoptions.
166. Dukette, supra note 18, at 240.
167. See supra note 40 and accompanying text regarding what adoptees feel.
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be traced to the adoption secret.i 68
There are adult adoptees who prefer to have their past re-
main anonymous and hidden.169 Courts and legislatures, however,
do not seem to be concerned about what the child and later the
adult would prefer in her life development.o7 0 Assumptions are
based on sketchy psychological information, and presumably also
based on the lawmakers' own experience as parents. As judges
and legislators ponder the horrors of "losing" one's child to a total
"stranger", they continue to render decisions and create statutes
that in effect favor adoptive parents.' 7i Such laws are not neces-
sarily in the best interest of the child and are certainly not in the
best interest of the adult adoptee.
VIII. The Adoption Triangle Revisited
"Hello, Heidi? This is Marion." I pause, trying to place the
name. Then the recognition-my birthmother. We talk about her
health, her family. Her voice, at last I hear her voice, and it is
nothing like I imagined. In my mind's eye as we talk I picture her
photo. The photo speaks to me in this unfamiliar voice. The call
ends. Her last words are "Well, maybe when I visit some of my
friends in Milwaukee, 17l just take a little side trip over to Minne-
apolis to visit you." This is what I wanted to hear. Suddenly the
168. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text. The goal of the state ought to
be to heal the wounds of the adoptee's identity crisis:
The goals for a child's successful adoption experience may be thought
about as steps that move through a natural sequence: first, separation
from the biological parents; then, union with the adoptive parents; and
finally, autonomy for the young adult adoptee. Whatever supports the
sequential tasks supports the ultimate achievement, the adoptee's abil-
ity as an adult to incorporate his or her membership in both biological
and adoptive families into a unique identity.
Dukette, supra note 18, at 241-42.
169. Sue Aumend & Marie Barrett, Searching and Non-searching Adoptees, 7
Adoption & Fostering 37, 38 (1983).
170. One court held the best interest of the child doctrine is secondary to the in-
terests of birth parents, adoptive parents and the state after the "child" becomes an
adult. In re William Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 806, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1978), review
denied, 92 Wash. 2d 1002 (1979).
171. Adoptive parents are typically better off financially than the birthparents,
another aspect of adoption which may influence the court. However, some courts
claim to go out of their way to overcome this bias: "[We go] well beyond a balance
sheet financial comparison." In re Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 291, 723 P.2d 829, 835
(1986). See also, In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 427, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483
(1977) (in conflict of rights between adoptee and birthparents or adoptive parents,
court must rule in favor of child, but opening of birth records is not in the best in-
terests of the child); In re McTaggert, 4 Ohio App. 2d 359, 368-69, 212 N.E.2d 663,
669 (1965) (birthmother denied custody even after withholding her consent to adopt




strange voice is familiar. I hang up the phone. "Who was that?"
my husband asks from the kitchen. A voice from the past, but no
stranger.
This article has examined the characteristics of the parties to
the adoption contract and the assumptions that judges and
lawmakers have about these people and their contract. The laws
that have resulted from these assumptions are rigid and mis-
guided. It is time to return to the parties and hear from them
what they would like the contract to represent. Unfortunately,
few states have asked adoptive parents, birthparents, and adopted
children what they desire in an effort to make adoption laws mir-
ror the needs of the parties involved. The answers challenge the
assumptions upon which the statutes and case law are based.
A. What Do Adoptive Parents Really Want?
Though many adoptive parents are initially concerned about
the stability of their relationship with their adopted child, in most
instances the child and the parents bond more closely as they grow
together as a family. Contrary to the apparent beliefs of many
lawmakers, adoptive parents feel secure about their relationships
with their adoptive children and do not express a need for with-
holding information from their adopted child after adulthood.
The majority of adoptive parents are supportive of their
child's search for birthparents.172 Mothers generally favor more
openness about the whole adoption process than do fathers,1
73
although both parents tend to agree that opening adoption records
to adult children is a good idea.174 Adoptive parents, however, are
leery of opening records to adoptees before they reach the age of
majority.175 Many adoptive parents express anxiety about having a
birthparent interfere with the family while the adoptee is still a
child. This anxiety lessens as the child becomes an adult. Adop-
tive parents are generally not in favor of barring adult adoptees
from access to confidential birth records.' 76
172. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 204-05. Parents who encouraged
the search tended to be liberal, highly educated, nonreligious, and accepting of wo-
men working outside the home. Id.
173. Id. at 201-03. Women have traditionally been more connected to family and
assumed the role of maintaining kinship ties. This may be an explanation for the
greater interest of mothers in disclosing background information to the child. Id.
174. Id. at 198.
175. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 83. Some parents express anger
at the suggestion of opening records to minor adoptees saying that they adopted the
child because they were guaranteed anonymity, not to "babysit." Id.
176. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 199; Sorosky, Baran & Pannor,
supra note 3, at 81. The anxiety experienced by adoptive parents may be a manifes-
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B. What Do Birthparents Really Want?
Most birthmothers say that they never stop wondering about
the child they placed for adoption.177 It is not surprising that most
birthmothers welcome opening records for their own use and for
the use of adoptive adults.
In one survey, the majority of birthparents interviewed were
married and had told their families and spouses about the adoption
experience.? 8 Some were curious about the child's development
as the child grew, 79 and the dream expressed most often by
birthparents was to develop a "friendship" with the adult
adoptee. 8 0 The majority of birthparents wanted a reunion with
the child after the adoptee became an adult if the adoptee wanted
to meet them.1s1 Birthparents also expressed gratitude toward
adoptive parents and did not want to interfere in the child's rela-
tionship with them. 8 2
In a majority of states, access to birth records is denied
birthparents as well as adult adoptees. Yet most birthmothers de-
sire the same information that their children seek.' 8 3 Naturally,
they are in favor of opening birth records.
C What Do Adult Adoptees Really Want?
Though not all adult adoptees choose to look into their hid-
den backgrounds, studies in England have shown that given the
opportunity of looking into their birth records, many adult
adoptees take advantage of the chance to discover more about
tation of latent anger toward the birthparents. This rage is the result of sexual in-
securities in adoptive parents who have been unable to conceive a child of their
own. Schneider & Rimmer, supra note 23, at 348.
177. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 56. It is common for birthmothers to make in-
quiries of the adoption agency about the well-being of the child. Sorosky, supra
note 3, at 49, 60.
178. Sorosky, supra note 3, at 51.
179. Id. at 52. Sorosky and colleagues found this to be true of 82% of the
birthparents in the survey. This was a survey of 38 birthparents selected at random
in 1976. Id. at 50-54.
180. Id. at 53.
181. Id. (82% of birthparents polled).
182. Eighty-seven percent of the birthmothers agreed. This helps to explain why
only 5% of the sample searched for their adult children. Id.
183. As one birthmother wrote, "I gave up my child five years ago. I was told
that the agency would find a family for my child if I gave up complete rights to
him, which meant that I would never be able to see him or know anything about
him.... I do not feel that agreement was fair to me or the child I relinquished."
Id. at 60-61.
Of course, not all birthmothers feel this way. Another birthmother disclosed
her anger in a letter, "I learned from my mistake and do not wish to have it thrown
in my face now or ever." Id. at 71.
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their personal histories.1s 4
Most adult adoptees who opt for the struggle of beginning a
search are interested in answering the question, "Why was I placed
for adoption?"' 8 5 Others are interested in learning more about
their family histories;186 still others are trying to construct com-
plete medical histories. 8 7 There are relatively few who desire
long-term relationships with their birthparents.188 To adoptees,
their concerns about the past and motivations for searching appear
reasonable, appropriate, and mature. Not surprisingly, adult
adoptees frequently state that they wish to be treated like the
adults that they are, rather than as ungrateful children who are a
disappointment to their parents and society. 8 9
A small minority of adult adoptees favors keeping birth
records closed,190 but the majority favors either opening records to
adult adoptees or establishing a national registry so that persons
184. From 1977 to 1982, 12,505 English adults sought information from their
records. Under the Children Act of 1975, all adoptees over 18 have had access to
birth records, although those adopted before passage of the Act must first attend a
"counselling interview" with a social worker. Erica Haimes & Noel Timms, Coun-
selling and the Children Act of 1975, 7 Adoption & Fostering 42, 42 (1983).
185. See Katherine Kowal & Karen Schilling, Adoption Through the Eyes of
Adult Adoptees, 55 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 354, 359 (1985) (while medical history
was the most desired information, well over half of those surveyed reported an in-
terest in why they were placed for adoption). As adult adoptees reach their own
childbearing years, they often become concerned with identifying their
birthparents. Id. at 359. See also Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 125-27
(pregnancy may precipitate search for birthparents).
186. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at 128. Many adult adoptees recog-
nize the undeniable impact of closed birth records on an entire line of descend-
ants-their children and grandchildren lack crucial pieces of their own genealogies.
Id. at 128.
187. Approaching middle age, adult adoptees see their family medical histories as
a blank that can cause some apprehension about the future. Sorosky, Baran & Pan-
nor, supra note 3, at 126-27. See also Kowal & Schilling, supra note 185, at 359.
188. Of 110 adult adoptees surveyed in 1982-83, only 15% said they were looking
for a sense of belonging or a replacement family. Most adult adoptees seek to fill a
void of identity. Kowal & Schilling, supra note 185, at 360-61. Some research indi-
cates that when the relationship between the adoptee and her adoptive parents is
good, the adoptee is simply looking for more complete information about herself.
Conversely, adoptees seeking a lasting relationship with their birthparents often
experienced a difficult adoption relationship. Martin Shaw, Growing Up Adopted,
in Adoption 113, 121 (Philip Bean ed. 1984). See also Feigelman & Silverman,
supra note 11, at 213. Other studies indicate that it is the most well-adjusted adult
adoptees who make the effort to retain contact with birthparents. See also
Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 213-14.
189. Kowal & Schilling, supra note 185, at 354. Many adult adoptees in fact are
caught in a "lingering childhood" attachment to the adoptive parents and refuse to
search at all for fear of hurting them. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, supra note 3, at
121-22.
190. Twenty-six percent of non-searchers said they favored closed records while
no searching adoptees favored closed records. This represents only 14% of the 131
total participants in the survey, Aumend & Barrett, supr-a note 98, at 257.
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wishing to make contact with birthparents or adopted children can
more easily do so.191 The sealing of birth records is contrary to the
desires of most adult adoptees, regardless of their intent to search
for birthparents.
D. What Does the State Really Want?
The court decisions barring access to confidential birth infor-
mation repeatedly stress the same points: the best interest of the
child, the anonymity required by the parties to the adoption, and
"preserving the integrity of the adoption process."192 Courts gener-
ally seem concerned that granting adult adoptees and birthparents
the right to examine adoption records will destroy the fabric of
adoption. Though courts have not been specific about what in this
"adoption revolution" is so alarming, the issues seem to be that
adoptive parents will be unlikely to adopt "orphan" children with
less than total confidentiality and that birthparents will not give
up their children if they cannot be assured of complete secrecy. In
addressing these fears sub silentio, courts maintain the secrecy of
adoption proceedings, even when all the parties to the adoption
have consented to the release of information.193
In fact, research has indicated that most birthparents wel-
come contact with their adopted children-turned-adults but do not
attempt to search for the adoptee for fear of disturbing the adop-
tive parents.194 Similarly, a majority of adoptive parents under-
stand their adopted child's need to explore the darkness of the
past.1 95 Adoptive parents support the opening of confidential birth
records as being in the best interest of their adult adoptee.196
The experience in England, where birth records have been
open since 1975, has shown that the new law has not altered the
191. Fifty-one percent of 131 adult adoptees surveyed said birth records shouC,
be open, and 30% selected a registry option instead. Id. at 258.
192. See, e.g., In re William Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 807, 586 P.2d 1201, 1204
(1979).
193. See, e.g., Golan v. Louise Wise Servs., 69 N.Y.2d 343, 348, 507 N.E.2d 275, 278,
514 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 (1987) (even when all parties consent to disclosure, a court
must satisfy itself that "good cause" exists for disclosure and that no limitations on
use of disclosed information are necessary).
194. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
196. As one adoptive father explained, "We don't look upon Chris' [the
birthmother] continuing presence as a threat or even a necessary evil. She is a
wonderful person who made a difficult, loving decision, and I know someday she
will do a lovely job of explaining it to Sacha, in person. She sees Sacha regularly,
and Sacha, when she can talk, will call her Chris and know that her "title" in the
family is birth mother, a term we plan to use as matter-of-factly as we would say
stepfather, aunt, or half-brother." Michael Blake, Letter to a Television Station,
Pacer Newsletter, Nov./Dec. 1987, at 7.
[Vol. 6:185
ADOPTION CONTRACTS
number of parents who want to adopt children.19 7 The reduction
in the number of children placed for adoption has more to do with
a declining birth rate and socially acceptable alternatives to adop-
tion, such as single motherhood and abortion, than to any lack of
"confidentiality".198
One concern may be that granting access to birth records may
spur some adoptive parents and birthmothers to "private adop-
tions," in which a lawyer, rather than an agency, makes the ar-
rangements between the respective parents. Often these
circumstances involve contracts, very similar to the surrogate
mother contract, which may include terms regarding acceptance
based on the health of the baby and the payment of huge fees to
cover the attorney's fee and the birthmother's medical expenses.199
These contracts, like all the contracts that have to do with the ex-
change of a human being who is excluded as a party to the con-
tract, should be void as against public policy.
The assumptions of courts and lawmakers regarding with-
holding confidential birth information are based on mistaken
premises. Opening access to birth records to the parties after the
adopted child has reached the age of majority will not diminish the
integrity of the adoption process. To the contrary, the integrity of
the adoption process is likely to be revitalized if birthmothers
know that the separation is not forever, adoptive parents no longer
feel as though they have "stolen" a baby from a stranger, and the
adult adoptee may eventually find answers to the questions about
the past from the person who can best respond to them.
IX. Recommendations
A conversation between my maternal grandmother and my
mother
Grandmother: That woman is going to steal Heidi away from
you!
Mom: I think her husband David already did that, Mother.
A conversation between my mother and me at an intimate birth-
day lunch:
Mom: It seems strange to think that you have an Other Mom.
But I've had to share you with other mothers before-your
Swiss mother, when you were an exchange student, and
David's mother, of course.
197. See Philip Bean, Introduction, in Adoption 1, 2 (Philip Bean ed. 1984).
198. Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 16.
199. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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Me: Mom, do you feel like my contact with my birthmother
has changed our relationship? I feel closer to you than ever.
Mom: No, I always knew you would find her. There are some
things I would like to say to her--do you mind if I send her a
note to tell her I have thought of her all these years on your
birthday?
Giving adult adoptees access to their birth records is long
overdue. The ways that this can be accomplished include changing
state laws, relaxing the common law standard, and altering the
adoption contract itself.
A. Changes in the Law
One solution is for each state to adopt provisions that would
allow adoptees and birthparents to see birth records at the child's
age of majority.200 The statute should also permit adoptive and
birth families to continue contact with each other following an
adoption through a mutual agreement approved by the court.
201
The advantages of changing the law include abandoning the
arbitrary good cause standard and doing away with the need for ju-
dicial intervention each time an adoptee wishes to see her birth
records. Access to the birth records of adoptees could be handled
through the department of vital statistics in each county, much
like access to death certificates, or through the agencies where the
adopted children were placed.202
The major disadvantage of this approach is that it will take a
long time to enact this kind of legislation in every state. Addition-
ally, there are likely to be disparities in the adoption laws from
state to state. Differences in the laws would likely advantage some
adult adoptees who search but disadvantage others. In our highly
mobile society, uniform legislation would be an advantage to all
parties to the contract who might find themselves in very different
locations after eighteen years have passed.
At the federal level, Congress could enact legislation creating
a national reunion registry to supplement access to birth records.
Such a national registry would provide adult adoptees,
birthparents, birth siblings, and adoptive parents a central location
to provide current addresses and telephone numbers in order to
assist in the search process.203 Those who did not wish to be con-
200. See Model State Adoption Act reprinted in Askin, supra note 77, at 8.
201. Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 134, at 61.
202. In England, adoptees receive this information from social workers at a
mandatory counselling interview. Haimes & Timms, supra note 184, at 42.
203. Paton, supra note 1.
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tacted directly or at all could leave appropriate information at the
reunion registry expressing their desires.
Another alternative is for legislatures to create a presump-
tion in favor of adult adoptees who request access to birth records,
placing the burden on the state to show a reason to deny access.
This option would best suit states which believe that each adult
adoptee's petition ought to go through the court system in order to
provide a safety net to catch the extremely rare case of a "dis-
turbed" person who is making the search in order to inflict harm
on others. Thus the state would bear the burden of showing why
the adult asking for the information is unfit to handle it.2° 4 A pre-
sumption favoring adult adoptees would be appropriate in light of
modern attitudes of all parties to adoption.
B. Changes in the Courtroom
Although the adult adoptee's dilemma can best be addressed
by legislative changes in favor of open adoption or new language
creating a presumption in favor of the adult adoptee, the access
problem can also be handled in court. Providing each adopted
child with a guardian ad litem at the adoption proceeding is one
solution. The guardian ad litem's task would be to advocate for
the best interest of the child, and the adult adoptee, as well. At
each adoption proceeding, the guardian ad litem would request
that the birth records of the child be unsealed at the age of
majority.
The advantage of making a guardian ad litem mandatory at
every adoption proceeding is that the child, who is currently not
represented as a party to the adoption contract, would have some-
one to address her interests at the formal adoption. By requesting
that adoption records be opened when the child becomes an adult,
the guardian ad litem would assure that at least some adult
adoptees will be able to take advantage of state laws which allow
access to records if requested at an adoption proceeding.205 The
guardian ad litem would remind judges that the adult adoptee has
needs which are distinct from those of the infant in the
courtroom.20 6
The disadvantage of the guardian ad litem is that it would
204. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text regarding dissent in relaxing
the good cause standard.
205. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
206. Courts increasingly appoint guardian ad litems in cases involving children,
even unborn children. For instance, in a dispute over the provision in a trust of a
will, the courts have appointed guardian ad litems to represent the interests of the
heir not yet born. Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A
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add expense to the adoption, an expense which states might be un-
willing to assume. If states refused to assume the additional ex-
pense, the guardian ad litem might drive up the costs of adoption
to adoptive parents who might be required to handle the costs.
Ideally, attorneys could be encouraged to donate their time to rep-
resent infant clients in adoption proceedings.
Another solution is a redefinition of the best interest of the
child standard which is applied to adoption proceedings and cases
evaluating the petitions of adult adoptees. The best interest of the
child deviates from that of the adult adoptee, so courts should
adopt a best interest of the adult adoptee standard in weighting
adult petitions. An adult's need to know identifying information
ought to be given special weight at the time of the original decree.
The adult adoptee should be given credit for having the maturity
and experience to know her own needs and to use this personal in-
formation with respect and sensitivity.
C. Changes in Adoption
One can also get at the source of the birth records dilemma
by altering the way society views adoption. One option is to
change the terms of the adoption contract to last only until the
adoptee reaches the age of majority.20 7 Adoption agencies should
emphasize this in placing children for adoption. This can be done
through legislative action or through negotiations at the adoption
proceeding with a guardian ad litem representing the child. As
part of their role in counseling adoptive parents, adoption agencies
should emphasize that the confidentiality about birth information
will end when the child reaches adulthood.
Many enlightened individuals have started a new trend in
adoption, without the guidance of courts, legislatures, or agencies.
This is called open adoption. While open adoption is not ideal for
every family, many professionals agree that an arrangement in
which all the parties know one another and maintain contact
through correspondence or visits benefits parents and children
alike.208 The adoptive parents know the birthmother's grief in giv-
ing up custody of the child, and the birthmother knows of the joy
of the adoptive parents who have a new member of the family.
209
person's right to information about her background is at least as important as an
unborn child's pecuniary interest in an estate.
207. Dukette, supra note 18, at 240.
208. Hoggett, supra note 4, at 140; Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 134, at 66;
Reuben Pannor & Annette Baran, Open Adoption as Standard Practice, 63 Child
Welfare 245, 246-47 (1984).
209. Blake, supra note 196, at 7.
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As the child matures, both parents have the privilege of watching
the child learn and ask questions, grow, love and, perhaps, some-
day become a parent in her own turn.
Open adoption requires extra expenses in attorneys' fees for
the custody and visitation contract and in family counseling as
needed. However, the advantages of openness take away the mys-
tery and stigma of traditional adoption and may actually reduce
some of the developmental problems which seem to affect adopted
children who grow up with the secret of their own adoption.
21 0
X. Conclusion
The time has come for a change in how adult adoptees are
treated in our society. Denying adult adoptees access to their birth
records through the terms of a contract in which they had no voice
or power to alter is unconscionable. Secrecy and permanent seal-
ing of birth records of adoptees should no longer be considered in
the best interest of anyone. Courts and legislatures are long over-
due in listening to the prevailing concerns of psychologists, social
workers, adoptive parents, birthparents, and adult adoptees. These
official and unofficial experts agree that changes need to be made
in order to help the adult adoptee develop to her fullest potential,
emotionally and psychologically.
Changes can be made at a number of different levels in order
to assist adult adoptees in finding out about their origins. State
laws need to be altered so that adoptees over the age of majority
can look at their birth records. If judicial intervention is consid-
ered important, lawmakers can provide guidelines for judges by
granting adult adoptees the presumption of access to birth records
and eliminating altogether the requirement of showing good cause.
The child should be represented by a guardian ad litem at the
adoption proceeding to guarantee that the rights of the adult-to-be
are secure. The courts can also broaden the best interests of the
child standard to include the needs of the adult adoptee. Finally,
open adoptions should be encouraged among adoptive and birth
families, thereby avoiding the issue of secrecy altogether.
In my imagination I see myself holding my own daughter in
my arms. And at my side are my two mothers, one dark haired,
and one blonde. At this gathering there is a love that transcends
guilt, abandonment, and self-doubt, a love that promises healing,
reconciliation, and rebirth. There will be no secrets for my daugh-
ter. Only mother-love: tripled.
210. Pannor & Baran, supra note 208, at 247.
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